THE NUMBER OF MILLIONAIRES IN SINGAPORE DEPENDS ON HOW MANY TIMES THE MONKEYS IN THE ZOO SCRATCH THEIR HEADS

I was trying to parse some numbers on wealth and millionaires and came across this old article from Mothership (23 Sep 2022). 

Mothership's views are seen as skewed in favour of the establishment. It was quick to flash this catchy and feel-good headline, careless as to veracity of the statement. Private wealth is not exactly public wealth. What if most of the private wealth is in overseas holdings, how does that make the city wealthy?  Having the 5th highest number of millionaires does not mean Singapore is the 5th wealthiest city in the world. 

Then again, earlier in 18 Aug 2022 article "S'pore's share of millionaires to grow from 7.5% in 2021 to 13.4% in 2030", Mothership stated the number of millionaires in Singapore in 2021 was 400,000, an incredible 37% difference from  their September article. Mothership was oblivious to the discrepancy as long as the headlines feel good.

Of course Mothership was simply referencing professional global wealth reports. In August it was HSBC report "The Rise of Asian Wealth" and September it was the Henley & Partner's "The 20 Wealthiest Cities in the World for 2022"  So why was there such a huge disparity of 2021 numbers of millionaires of 250,000 and 400,000 that Mothership glossed over? 

The lesson here is a small dose of skepticism and a big spoonful of critical thinking in what we read is healthy. Challenging suppositions is not being conspiratorial but the very foundation of healthy inquiry.

The reason for the huge difference of 250,000 and 400,000 millionaires has got to do with the focus, methodology, definitions and formulation of the reports. It is of course beyond outsiders to get behind these reports to observe how they are actually prepared. Private wealth excludes the net assets of the city (public wealth). Researchers cull data from various sources such as the city's statistical publications on demographics, household expenditures, savings, taxes, debts, from land registries, real estate transactions, stock exchange transactions, financial data from banks and central banks, etc. All these reports from the public domain are anonymised data which researchers feed into their system with their own algorithm and formulae. Could the formulae be based on the number of times the monkeys in the zoo scratched their heads? Of course not, but you get the point.

Apart from what may be culled from public domain, Henley's report is based on data feed from New World Wealth, a global wealth intelligence firm based in South Africa which tracks the movements and spending habits of the world’s wealthiest people. They do this based on 150,000 high net worth  individuals they maintain on their datasets. Henley's numbers for Singapore appears too low. Could it be they are skewed towards a migration and passport strength focus and downplaying on the larger indigenous population?

I have no access to HSBC's full report so unable to express any opinion on the 400,000 millionaires in 2021.

For year 2022, Henley's World Wealth Report 2023 of numbers of millionaires in various cities shows consistency with 2021. Singapore remains in 5th spot but a slightly lower number of millionaires of 240,100. With a total population of 6.2m that means 1 out of everyone 25 persons you meet on the streets is a millionaire.

On a comparative note let's look at the more popular Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report 2023. This report looks at wealth at country level instead. According to CS there were 332,000 millionaires in Singapore in 2022, mid-point between the figures from Henley and HSBC. Maybe relying on the number of times the monkeys in the zoo scratch their head is a better option after all. 332,000 means 1 out of every 20 persons you meet on the streets is a millionaire. Incredible.

CS report has much more details delving into micro and macro-economics. Perhaps a more meaningful gauge of  the sense of wealth is metrics on distribution per adult. Here is CS' top 20 country ranking of wealth per adult in terms of the mean (simple average) and the median (mid-point).

On the mean basis, Switzerland ranks #1 and Singapore #8. On average each adult in Singapore has a wealth of US$382,960. On the median basis, the rankings change drastically. Singapore is ranked #17 and Belgium is #1. Singapore adults have a median wealth of US$99,940. It means  US$99,940 is the middle line and one half of adults in Singapore has wealth in excess of this while the other half has less.

Inequality of wealth distribution is the reason for the change in rankings between mean and median figures. Lower gini coefficient (lower inequality) favours the country's median figure. Singapore has a very high gini coefficient of 78.8, ie very unequal wealth distribution, which explains the big difference in its mean and median ranking.

It is about the residents in Singapore, ie inclusive of Permanent Residents and long visa holders of foreigners working here. Singapore has all the positive attributes that attract immigration - pro-business government, low tax regime, low crime, good quality of life, cosmopolitan, good business climate, marvelous infrastructure, good schools, etc. and most importantly a Global Investor Program  designed for wealthy and experienced foreign entrepreneurs, business owners, and managers who are interested in starting a business or investing in Singapore and who wish to make the country their home. Singapore has been consistently seeing a net inflow of high networth individuals.

The top 3 countries that had the most net gains in high networth individuals in 2022 were UAE, Australia, and Singapore in that order. Australia has traditionally been a favourite, but UAE is fast becoming a go to country. A friend who returned recently from the COP28 Climate Summit mentioned the many Christmas decorations he saw in Dubai. Unusual for Islamic country but testimony to accommodation needed to attract international high networth individuals. In 2022, Singapore had net inflows of 2,900 compare to UAE which received net inflows of 5,200.

The countries that had the most net lost in high networth individuals in 2022 were China (10,800), Russia (8,500) and India (7,500). Most Russians and Indians headed for UAE while most Chinese to Singapore and Australia.

As a pro-establishment site, Mothership conveniently failed to explain to readers these wealth figures are not about Singaporeans. If the government brings in 1 more high networth individual, the mean wealth figure will increase, but will have no impact on the median wealth figure. The millionaire numbers will likewise increase.

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MOSCOW NARODNY BANK -- WAS THERE CLOAK & DAGGER UNDER THE NOSE OF MAS (PART 2)

MNB is a UK-domiciled bank owned by Gosbank, the central bank of USSR. It opened its Singapore branch in 1971. The USSR collapsed in 1991 and MNB was taken over by, and renamed VTB Bank, a Russian state-owned bank, in 2005.

Within 3 years, MNB's loan portfolio of US$600m was the largest amongst Singapore banks. It made quick and deep forays into the Chinese business community with cross-holdings in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Hongkong. It made the authorities in the region wary of Soviet economic expansionism as a means of influence building to counter American power in Vietnam. But was there basis for this fear or was it a simple case of overtly aggressive bank lending. After all, Teo Poh Kong, an Asst General Manager of Overseas Union, and ex-BOA executive, recruited by MNB and given a long leash to run the entire operations, had boasted they will be a top bank in no time.

I joined the bank as a junior staffer in the Internal Audit Dept in the later half of 1970s. By then the bank was in decline, having been defrauded twice, massive loan write offs, reputational disasters, all leading to diminished counter-party lines and higher cost in money market fundings. From my perch in Internal Audit, I had front row seat in what was transpiring. Soviet apparatchiks that made up the management on the 5th floor had very little experience in commercial banking. The bank's loan portfolio was basically third and fourth tier borrowers. Collateral arrangements lacked valuations and legal documentation not perfected. Credit files hardly existed. There was a complete absence of evidence of loan evaluation and approval process. 

One of the first task I did was to perform a credit audit on a group of companies that required qualifications such as to call into question the entire files in the Credit Dept. By that time, the department was manned by an entirely new team, including the manager. There was no one who was in a position to answer my audit queries. Under the circumstances, my audit coverage was extended to 28 groups. The state of affairs was an auditor's nightmare. This example illustrates the vacuum that existed. There were two borrowers etched in my memory -- Chen Kung and Sadanobu Ogawa. There were absolutely nothing in the credit files and the credit officers knew nothing. Some 20 years later long after I had left the bank, I came across an article in some magazine that mentioned Sadanobu Ogawa is the alias of Chen Kung. I presented a no-holds barred report pointing to the utter inadequacy of record maintenance, collateral imperfections, and quality of the loans.

The Russian management obviously knew the bank was in great trouble but had no idea it was that bad. I believe up to that point they had never seen such a frank and detailed audit report. Many years later I was told by HR the report impressed the Russians they wanted me transferred to the 5th floor as a special assistant. This never materialised which I put down to the throes the bank's problems were causing in Moscow that necessitated recalling the Singapore GM back to face economic crimes. There were whispers he faced the firing squad.

By the time I arrived at the bank, Teo and some other management staff had already exited. The accountant was planning his emigration to Australia. It seemed to me some shenanigans had transpired and some locals had taken the bank to the cleaners.

Was there Sovie agenda of infiltration into the region as some suspected. My opinion is nyet, very unlikely. There were no loans to politically connected persons, ruling out influence buying. Loans were to 3rd/4th tiered private borrowers, not to the top-tiered politically-connected families. That's often the route a new bank takes when it wants to expand fast. There wasn't a targeted market of strategic sectors. It's true MNB was highly exposed to the real estate sector in Singapore and Malaysia. It made some loans to the commodities sector in Indonesia which had the government concerned of the market being cornered. There were some who saw a Soviet loan trap in their ability to control liquidity and impact the economy of host country. Except it made no sense for the bank to pull the rug under their customers and hurt themselves. The USSR simply had no capability to weaponise financial muscle for political advancements. The fear was somewhat similar to today's propaganda on Chinese debt trap but it is nowhere similar in scale nor strategic base. Chinese loans are massive and primarily in strategic infrastructure and to state borrowers. MNB was more commercial lending and real estate development.

There was however the curious case of Amos Dawe. He came out of nowhere from a postal clerk to head a hotchpotch group of companies spreaded over the region. I had difficulty figuring out where his core business base was. The picture in my mind was a young man plucked out of obscurity, provided access to vast financial resources, go buy up some businesses and become the man about town. In quick time he owned a conglomerate called Mosbert group with presence across the region. It seemed to me a tangled mess of financial engineering going on with numerous inter-company borrowings meant to obscure funding sources. If he was a Manchurian candidate, there was not much strategic sense in his investments from Soviet point of view except in two ventures.

First was the floatation of a 5 month old Golden International Securities Ltd on a nascent Kowloon Stock Exchange. But that venture had all the trappings of financial fraud which involved Urban Councillor Peter Chan Po Fan, chairman of Kowloon Stock Exchange, rather than some insidious Soviet plot out to destabilise China as some Western observers suggested. 

The second venture was Dawe's attempt to buy 3 American banks in Silicon Valley - the Peninsula National Bank, the First National Bank of Fresno, and the Tahoe National Bank. In 1974 Amos Dawe had secured a US$50m facility from MNB for this purpose. The layered funding drew the attention of a Singapore-based CIA agent who tracked the transaction that culminated in Dawe being indicted for wire fraud in 1975. Whilst the US is open to bank acquisitions by anyone, Dawe's MNB backing and the layering of the payments were highly suspicious.  The Americans decided it was Soviet attempt to gain access to US technology secrets. 

CIA leaked the Soviet plot to Raymond Sacklyn, publisher of a Hong Kong financial newsletter, Target. When the story broke, MNB's relationship with Dawe ended. The bank pulled the rug and Dawe was unable to complete the bank purchases.

Dawe plea-dealed and co-operated with CIA. He admitted to acting under instructions of the Soviets. MNB denied the allegations and claimed the loans to Dawe were strictly commercial transactions.The US dropped charges in 1979. Dawe was extradited to Hongkong where he faced financial fraud charges. In 1984 he was sentenced to 5 years in prison. After that, Amos Dawe completely disappeared. Some said he was liquidated by KGB.

Did Dawe lie to save his own skin in the US, or was he fronting for the Soviets? The later has weight given purchase of US banks made no sense to Dawe's business interest in the region. If so, he seemed to be an isolated case.

There was another interesting incident which never saw the light of day and of which I had personal knowledge. This had to do with an innocuous loan to a small bookstore somewhere in Beach Road, the name of which I no longer recall. The proprietor was Mr Cho, a nonentity other than he was a younger brother of Cho Jock Kim of the old Consolidated Holdings infamy, a customer of MNB. Mr Cho drowned in Brastagi Lake, Indonesia, where he was vacationing. To sort out his affairs, the bank needed a valuation of his stocks. My assistant and I were sent out to do an inventory count in a private residential house somewhere Serangoon Gardens side of Yeo Choo Kang Road. There I was, spending 3 days in the sweltering heat crouching bare-chested in the low attic, sorting the mess of books dumped callously there. As I counted, I would yell to my colleague who did the recording in the room below. Throughout the day I was yelling "Lenin Vol 13" x 10, "Karl Marx Vol 5" x 8, "Lenin Vol 13" add another 9, and so on. There were 47 volumes of Lenin, and 48 volumes of Karl Marx. 90% of the inventory was Lenin and Marx. Mind you, they were all hardcover books.

When the task was done I submitted the count list to the credit officer in charge. It was a pointless task as anyone with a half brain could see the inventory of communist ideology books were not worth the paper they were printed on. It was in fact illegal to sell such books in those days. As if to reinforce this point, a fairly well-known Indian lawyer was charged about that time for possession of a Karl Marx book. Since the gentleman practiced out of an office in Beach Road, I assumed he bought the book from Mr Cho's bookstore. The first question really is why should someone set up shop to sell something for which there is no real market? I could only comprehend it as an accommodation for the loans extended to Consolidated Holdings. Obviously the apparatchiks needed to promote communist ideologies on the bye. The second question is why was the bookstore allowed to sell banned books?

Was the MAS sensitive to the activities of MNB? I have no idea except I recall there was one inspection conducted by the central bank. I had no interaction with the inspection team.

Two years into my job at the bank, I realised MNB had set up an office for Dennis Lee, a  partner in law firm Messrs Lee & Lee. He was put on a retainer. Dennis, of course, was the brother of Lee Kuan Yew. Was that influence buying or what, I have no idea.

Now there was one huge-sized officer at the bank whom I shall call 'K'. He was in military intel during his national service days. Outwardly he was anti-establishment, bad-mouthing the government every which way. I sensed it was all a facade and secretly he was collecting info for whatever his purpose. Many years after leaving the bank, K stood for election under an opposition banner and lost. Somehow I still felt he was a PAP plant. K came across as obnoxious for almost everyone in the bank and none really wanted any social chat with him. For some reason, he favored my company, but I sensed he was really taxing my brain on the bank's loan affairs. Several months after I left the bank, I received a call from K who inquired if I would please have lunch with a certain 'WMM' who was once a partner in the law firm Lee & Lee. K explained WMM had some questions regarding MNB. My antennae shot up immediately, but since I was no longer an employee, ethics of confidentiality no longer apply. Out of curiosity I accepted the invitation. However, it turned out to be a non-event. I expected an interrogation but all I faced was just some polite innocent questions. There was no deep probing. I did not know what to make of that meeting.

I believe MNB was run as a commercial bank, not as conduit for Soviet cloak and dagger adventurism. But when the need arises, those they coddled can be compromised to accommodate their agenda. Amos Dawe and the bookstore at Beach Road certainly fit the bill. MNB's massive loan problem was the result of a reckless expansion phase of quantity over quality, of clueless Soviet apparatchiks out of KGB masquerading as management, and the key to the vault in the hands of a single local manager, the good old Teo Poh Kong. I think the fear decades ago, of the Soviets using MNB cash to subvert and destabilise the region, is the same as today's debt trap xenophobia attached to China's loans to African states and countries involved in the One Belt One Road project. 


Coming up - Part 3 (Wirecard)

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NUGAN HAND BANK -- WAS THERE CLOAK & DAGGER UNDER THE NOSE OF MAS (PART I)

No matter how strict the banking regulators, how incorruptible and well-qualified its personnel, and how good the legislation, no country is spared the occasional crisis of financial fraud, huge credit defaults, money-laundering, and bank failures.

Singapore has had its fair share. The worst on the patch was the 1995 failure of Barings Bank due to fraudulent options trading conducted by its Singapore branch. Much has been written and spoken about the affair but none has ever suggested attribution to regulatory failure. In my humble opinion, a policy meant to shield MAS personnel from influence buying takes some blame. During my time in the banking industry, MAS personnel were basically forbidden to accept even lunch invitations from the banking fraternity. Their absence from the drinking holes and other socialising functions meant they were like generals commanding from HQ, unwary of what's going on in the foxholes. They do not have their hands on the pulse, thus missing out on critical intel. For example, in the case of Barings, regulatory personnel had no idea what the market had long suspected was going on at their options trading desk. MAS was two or three steps behind.

More serious a matter is where a financial entity is being operated by foreign governments or agents for cloak and dagger operations. Has there been any in Singapore?

I blogged about Nugan Hand Bank last year in the article on "Truman shows".

"Back in 1978 when I was working in a bank, I had lunch with a friend one day. I shall conceal any trace to ID this friend. Just suffice to say I found him a very mysterious and mystical character given to access to some information that few have. He seems to have a knack for any subject matter that creeps up in idle conversation and acquainted either directly or indirectly with personalities referenced. I had long suspected him to be working for some Intelligence organisation. On his part, he enjoys my company because he said, unlike most ordinary folks, I could engage him in all sorts of unusual subject matter, a compliment I attribute to my scattered interests and I was widely read at the time, devouring magazines like Newsweek, The Economist, Time Magazine, Financial Times etc.

Over lunch that day, I brought up the matter of Nugan Hand Bank opening a branch in Singapore. He asked what I thought of the matter. I felt it strange that MAS should approve the licence for a bank that had hardly any history (it was incorporated in Australia in 1973), without any reciprocity which has been MAS policy, and owned by a couple of guys no one in the industry knew. He told me he knew one of the co-founders, Michael Hand, back in Vietnam War days. According to him, Hand was a decorated Green Beret, but was already dabbling in drugs during the war. Nugan Hand was set up as CIA banker, sourcing funds from drug operations. Today one can google and dive deep into the CIA-drugs-gun running-money laundering operations of Nugan Hand. But back in 1978 we had no access to any info. Of course I took my friend's claims with a pinch of salt. Then to my amazement, in 1980 Frank Nugan, the partner of Hand, was found dead in a car in Australia, execution style. The bank collapsed in 1980 under a cloud of massive fraud and criminal activities including drug trafficking. Hand disappeared, lots of international investigation and inquiries, but no one went to jail. Except one - the accountant Mr. Tan who ended up in Singapore jail on account of the fact he was the Local Principal of the branch. Innocent chap, the sacrificial goat to close the chapter in Singapore."

As to why MAS issued a banking licence to a practically unheard of entity which operated a branch in the Golden Triangle of Burma, let's just label it under "mystery".

To make sense of all these, we should take a look at how MAS handled another interesting foreign bank application. BCCI was founded by Pakistani private banker Agha Hasan Abedi. It was incorporated in Luxembourg in 1972 . It counted Middle Eastern royalties amongst its shareholders. At its height, BCCI was one of the largest private banking groups in the world with a presence in 69 countries.

BCCI desired to set up a branch in Singapore and submitted an application for an offshore banking licence in 1973. It was rejected as the bank had no track record. In following years, BCCI doggedly sent their executives to meet MAS managers. One such lobbyist was Van Oenen, head of BOA Singapore, who was one time a BCCI director when BOA was a shareholder. Van Oenen was well-known to MAS, having helped advise the setting up of the Asian Currency Unit. In 1980 BCCI re-applied unsuccessfully. MAS rejected BCCI again, this time on grounds of its poor international standing. Van Oenen met with Dy PM Goh Keng Swee and Finance Minister Hon Sui Sen to appeal for reconsideration. MAS re-studied the status of BCCI and denied the request. BCCI tried again in 1985 with a letter of recommendation from British PM Harold Wilson to Lee Kuan Yew. Once again, MAS did not approve the application.

MAS' decision had considered feedback from banks and regulators in the jurisdictions where BCCI operated, advices of other central bankers and international banks, and its own instincts when reviewing the bank. One key issue was BCCI used different auditors in different branches and there was a lack of consolidated supervision. MAS stressed their decisions were never "dazzled or intimidated by well-known names or high-powered connections", or majority opinion, but strictly disciplined on "principles of ensuring that any institution admitted to Singapore must have high prudential standards, a strong international reputation, and management with integrity."

MAS was proven right when BCCI collapsed in 1991 with US$15b missing from its balance sheet, making it the biggest bank fraud in world history. The bank moved dark and dirty money of mafias, human and drug traffickers, weapons' traders, corrupt money of dictators and despots. It loaned huge sums to shareholders.

In his memoir, Lee Kuan Yew mentioned this episode. He had concluded Harold Wilson's letter was merely a pro-forma he signed doing someone a favor. It was not a personal appeal to him. He had observed the endearment "Yours Sincerely" was type written. It should have been hand written in a personal letter. On that score he supported MAS' decision to reject the BCCI yet again. One wonders had the letter been personal, would Lee Kuan Yew have been 'dazzled' by Harold Wilson's recommendations and override MAS' decision?

MAS' disciplined approach to vet applicants is to be lauded. But the question no one asks is why did it not apply in the case of Nugan Hand Bank? In fact, Nugan Hand was not an isolated case. The same level of rigour in assessing applicants was also not applied in the case of Tat Lee Bank.


Coming up -  Part 2 (Moscow Narodny Bank)

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VACCINE INJURY RISKS SHOCKINGLY HIGHER THAN WHAT'S BEEN TOLD

You can bet your last dollar and your house that none of these folks above, nor any other high profile personalities, really took the novel mRNA Covid-19 vaccine. They were all given saline solutions. The reason is very simple. Should any of these publicity stunts go awry with a Suspected Adverse Event (SAE) and heaven forbids, a death, the whole vaccination drive collapses. The risk to Big Pharma, not the actors, is just too big.

In November 2021, the head nurse of the University Medical Center in Ljubljana, Slovenia, resigned from her job and made a public announcement that based on her personal work routines, she claimed the novel Covid-19 vaccines came in 3 different markings. The ones marked "1" are saline solutions used as placebo for VIPs which accounted for 30% of the vaccines. Everyone else gets either those marked "2" or "3". Number 2 is classical RNA. The number 3 is an RNA stick that contains the oncogene associated with the adenovirus, which contributes to the development of cancer. Her short video clip is here.

The video caused a scandalous uproar in Slovenia. As it turned out, the 'chief nurse' was a Slovenian anti-vaxxer activist named.Vera Kanalec. The chief nurse of the University of Ljubljana Medical Center is Zdenka Mrak who has not resigned from her job. My point for showing this video is to highlight what the fake nurse said in November 2021 : 

* 30% of vaccines are placebos
* Vaccines are identified by 3 different markers

The initial novel vaccine narrative was "it will prevent a vaccinated person from catching Covid-19 and prevent the spread of the disease". When this was proven false, the narrative evolved to "it will prevent a vaccinated person from developing serious effects when infected". It is incredible a gullible world could not see through the new narrative for what is obviously an unfalsifiable fallacy.


The Danish study:

Due to Emergency Use Authorization, rapid production of Covid-19 novel vaccine and implementation of large-scale vaccination programs, there has been many reports of contamination and inconsistencies in toxicity levels and ingredients. There is also lack of reports on clinical data on individual vaccine batch levels. Consequently, there is no assurance of homogeneity of vaccine efficacy across all batches. If indeed this were so, then good luck to you as risk of SAE depends on which batch the dose that was injected into your deltoid came from.

A trio of researchers Max Schmeling, Vibeke Manniche and Peter Riis Hansen did a study on whether safety is batch-dependent using the Danish experience. Their peer-reviewed report was published by European Journal of Clinical Investigation on 30 Mar 2023. (Here).

The Danish Data :-
Period covered - 27 December 2020 to 11 January 2022)
Population - 5.8m

Numbers vaccinated - 4,026,575
Vaccine - BNT162b2 (Pfizer)
Number of batches - 52 (2340 to 814,320 doses per batch)
Doses administered - 10,793,766 doses
Total SAEs (Suspected Adverse Events) - 66,587 (some had no batch labels)
Total SAEs batch identified - 61,847
Total severe SAEs - 14,509 (23.5%)
SAE-related deaths - 579 (0.9%)

SAEs are classified into severity levels of (A) non-serious, (B) serious (hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, life-threatening illness, permanent disability or congenital malformation), and (C) SAE-related death.
For each batch, SAEs per 1,000 doses is computed.
The 2 variables of the 52 batches tracked are (a) SAEs per 1,000 and (b) number of doses per batch.

The unanalysed chart (each dot represents a single vaccine batch) :

Some statistics gibberish here. (Doesn't matter if you are not familiar with these):
Since the observed relationship between the numbers of SAEs and BNT162b2 vaccine doses was highly heterogeneous, conventional regression statistics were not considered to be applicable. Therefore, heterogeneity in the relationship between the numbers of SAEs and doses per vaccine batch was assessed by log-transformation followed by non-hierarchical cluster analysis and general linear model (GLM) test for differences in SAE rates between batches. Reporting of the study conforms to broad EQUATOR guidelines.

The analysed chart (each dot represents a single vaccine batch) :

Three regression or trend lines become apparent:
Blue line - the batches have high SAEs per 1,000 doses (means higher toxicity) and low number of doses per batch.
Green line - the batches have lower SAEs per 1,000 doses (means lower toxicity) and high number of doses per batch.
Yellow - the batches have no SAEs per 1,000 doses.

Danish vaccination reporting system provides anonymized data. Researchers can access individual information without medical privacy issues. Each batch data point can be further analysed to SAE severity levels of (i) total SAEs, (ii) serious and (iii) SAE-related deaths.

Interpretation:

The blue batches make up only a small 4.22% of total doses, but account for 70% of all SAEs (27% of those vaccinated with serious SAEs  and 47% deaths, were caused by blue batches.)

The green batches make up the majority with 64% of total doses, but account for only 29% of all SAEs (72% of those vaccinated with serious SAEs  and 52% deaths, were caused by green batches.)

The yellow batches make up 32% of total doses, but account for almost zero SAEs.


What can be inferred ?

1. There is no doubt whatsoever the Yellow batches are placebos.

2. The Blue batches have the highest toxicity but lower doses in each batch. Small but pack a lot of punch. This is intended to do the worse targeted damage. The fact blue batches make up only slightly less than 5% of total doses is highly suspicious. In statistical analysis, 5% is generally used as the threshold for significance testing. Anything higher draws attention and deeper scrutiny. For example, if someone has a winning formula for a casino game, if he attempts to win every game, he will be discovered fairly quickly by security. In WWII, when Britain broke into Nazi Germany's Enigma code which enabled it to locate enemy submarines, they only targeted 5% of the U-boats. Had Britain attacked all enemy submarines, then the Germans would have realised their Enigma code has been broken.

3. The percentages seem to fall into common categories of 5%, 30%, 50%, 60%, 70%. This does not seem accidental, but human connivance.

Calculate your risks:

Unless you are the privileged few to take placebos, and you are the smarter ones to want to know what is the risks now that data is available, let's review how you play with your life.

(a) Your overall chance of getting a Suspected Adverse Event is 1 out of 174, of getting a serious SAE is 1 out of 744, and of death is 1 out of 18,642.

(b) You have technically 32% chance of getting a placebo, a 64% chance of getting a toxic dose (green batch) and a tough luck 4% chance of getting a highly toxic dose (blue batch).

(c) If you are given a placebo, there will be no SAE. The SAE and death numbers are probably due to statistical anomalies from small population numbers.

(d) If you get the toxic dose, you have  1 out of 385 chance of getting SAE, a very very high 50% chance your SAE is serious, with a high 1 out of 59 chance of death.

(e) If your luck ran out and you got the highly toxic dose, you have a very high 1 out of 10 chance of getting an SAE. In which case, you have 1 out of 11 chance the SAE is serious and 1 out of 160 chance of death.

If the Danish data is universal, would you have taken the jab had you better understood the odds? Is 1 out of 18,642 chance of dying from a jab fine with you? Mind you, the Danish experience data is interesting for the fact their population base is fairly similar with Singapore's. 

Given a low probability of catching Covid if one takes all precautions, and an extremely low fatality rate of less than 1%, would you have taken the novel vaccine in light of what this Danish study shows?  Let's not even take into consideration long term unknowns.

Had the government known about this risk profile and not advised the public, it is malfeasance, and in the case of death, it is culpable homicide. 

The inevitable question:

Now how in the world can that fake nurse know in November 2011 that 30% of the vaccines were placebos. If this was a coincidence, how did she know there are 3 classifications of vaccines based on the level of toxicity?

Conclusion:

The Danish study proves there is no batch homogeneity. The percentages seem to betray human connivance. The statistics seem to indicate intention to cause harm. The risk of serious SAEs including deaths with the the blue and green batches, are unexceptionally high, but averaged out overall presents a more acceptable risk level. But with no batch homogeneity, the Swedish study shows the safety of the BNT162b2 mRNA Covid-19 vaccine is batch-dependent. This is a critical piece of information that has not been presented to the medical community.

The Danish data carries a caveat of biased reporting. Just as the VAERS are notoriously under-reported, so too the data in this study, especially pertaining to vaccine deaths. The risk figures from this study could potentially be worse than shown here.

The US has the VAERS which has online information available for downloading. In Denmark, vaccine batches are registered by the Danish Serum Institute and all SAE cases with corresponding vaccine batch labels are reported to the Danish Medical Agency (DKMA) and classified by the DKMA according to SAE seriousness. The DKMA-managed spontaneous SAE reporting system accepts reports of SAEs from any source, for example healthcare providers, patients and other members of the public. Anonymised data are available for downloading by the public.

Singapore obviously has some similar reporting systems in place. But Singapore data is not available to the public.


Note:
My bad. I had been mentioning Swedish report when it should have been Danish. now edited. (11 Dec 2023). 

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