Tuesday, July 28, 2020

Temasek Tracking - Gazillion Entertainment


Video killed the Radio Star
Sex killed the Video Game!

2005  Founded (according to Linkedin info)
2009  Gazillion signed 10 year contract with Disney to develop Marvel Entertainment games
2010  Temasek led Seed funding of US$60m
2017  Series C funding US$30m
2017  Disney terminated relationship with Gazillion
Total funds raised : US$250M

Gazillion is a MMO (massively multiplayer online) game developer and publisher. 

The beginning and the ending of Gazillion are rather confusing. Google search throws up all incorrect information. Which begs the question of whether Temasek actually knew. Since there may be folks out there who may like a clearer narrative, I'll do a full monty here. This has bearings on the review of the investment.

Such creative projects require 3 personalities - the entrepreneur or ideas man, the tech guy, and the development lead man. Ron Hutter was the Ideas man. Hutter is from the education sector. He founded Edusoft, a successful educational company. He also ran a VC firm. He had an idea for an educational material on an MMO platform and in 2005 filed NR2B Research for this project. He searched for a lead designer. John Romero saw the placement on linkedin and that's how they met. Romero is the Tech guy. He had produced several games to his credits. Hutter invited Romero in as co-founder.

Romera said the company name NR8B Research was inappropriate for a video game outfit and he suggested a more street cred name Slipgate Ironworks. They went by that name for a while, but eventually filed name change from NR8B to Gazillion. SEC filing record confirms this.

They recruited David Breviit as the COO. Brevit earned fame for his role in the development of popular video game Diablo. In 2011, John Needham took over from Hutton as CEO. Brevit took over CEO role in 2013.

They commenced work and produced some titles. The big break came in 2009 when Hutter signed a contract with Disney to produce MMO games using Marvel characters. Hutter and Romero disagreed on the issue of Intellectual Property. Hutter-Disney contract was a licensed right for 10 years. Romero refused to do work without IP and he quit in the same year.

Nothing that is published online, from Bloomberg to Crunchbase, describes the beginnings that way. The narrative came from the horse's mouth in an interview by Morgan Ramsay in his book "Online Game Pioneers at Work".

Brevit producted 2 Marvel games which debut in 2013. It was not well received. David Von Dorman had came on board as director representing investor Roth Capital. Dorman ousted Brevit and took over in 2015. Gazillion was recapitalised and revamped. By 2017 the Marvel games improved their player base. There was a Series C funding round. Don't know if Temasek participated. 


Towards the end of 2017 came the bombshell. Disney indicated it did not wish to continue with the relationship which will expire Dec 31. The plug was pulled and Gazillion closed in November with no severance pay for employees and customer deposit claims unsettled. In 2018 Trion Worlds bought out various development assets of Gazillion.

Nothing is published online as to why Disney pulled the plug when the Marvel games were beginning to go viral and about to move into Playstation 4 and Xbox One. Did Temasek know the truth?

It seemed David Von Dorman's real name is Dave Dohrmann, a known sexual abuser. His identi
ty was uncovered by gamers and there was some doxxing going on. Some Gazillion female employees came forward with sexual allegations. Disney was quick to act and pulled the plug.

For those who enjoy a bit of sleaze, an achieved Reddit commentary with more details is here.


On a serious note, one wonders whether Temasek's investment in 2010 was bona fide. Why dive into a project where the lead designer and co-founder has just resigned. Why pour millions into a development with only a 10 year licence?

INVESTMENT WATCH:
The money is all gone. Just wondering if the investment has been written off in 2019 financials.



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Monday, July 27, 2020

Temasek Tracking - Magic Leap


2011 Founded
2017 Funding round US$502 led by Temasek Series E
2018  US$2,300 headset unveiled


What is Virtual Reality:  VR completely replaces the user's real-world environment with a simulated one.

What is Augmented Reality:  AR is also called Mixed Reality. There are 3 features - a combination of real and virtual worlds, real-time interaction, and accurate 3D registration of virtual and real objects


AR is the next big leap for computing. Modern smartphones offer a primitive version of mixed reality. Many big names in IT are working on some AR headsets. In 2003 Googgle Glass came and went. Microsoft has their HoloLens which also did'nt take off commercially although it has a more advanced version for industrial and professional use.

Every tech company wants to make AR glasses mainstream. Very very big buck beckons to the first to arrive. But all the big names know that it is still a long way off. Tim Cook said “the technology itself doesn’t exist” for quality AR glasses. 


AR will usher in a whole new age of computing, of new hardware, devices, gadgets, operating systems, applications, games, entertainment etc. It will be a game changer in lifestyles, education, healthcare, research etc. That is why the geek community, the tech firms and investors are terribly excited.

In 2011 Magic Leap was born. Co-founder Rony Abovitz is the typical eccentric and idealistic tech startup guy that can sell refrigerators to eskimos.  He promised a breathtaking futuristic product that will rival television or the telephone in societal impact. Magic Leap will produce not just a headset, but spatial computing technologies that offer consumers high-end AR experiences and tools to support remote working with futuristic mixed reality glasses for everyday computing. It will be a market-shifting creative platform and incredible hardware that would open up a new artistic medium that will replace phones, computers, and every other high-tech screen in our lives.

Big name investors signed up - NTT Docomo Inc., AT&T Inc., Alphabet Inc., (Google's holding co), Alibaba etc. Saudi SWF and Temasek followed suit at a later stage funding in 2017. Abovitz's pitch brought in US$2.6B and Magic Leap became one of the most highly funded tech startup with valuation of US$6-US$8B..

The Real Reality:  Magic Leap spent 7 years in deep secret development. Finally in 2018 it launched Magic Leap One. It's a three-piece system that includes a headset called Lightwear, a small wearable computer called the Lightpack, and a handheld controller. "Spatial computing" is having hologram-like objects projected into three-dimensional space with incredibly realistic virtual objects. It is a functional, thoughtfully designed headset with some very real advantages over competitors. But it doesn’t seem like a satisfying computing device or a radical step forward for mixed reality. It simply did not live up to it's hype. It failed to gain adoption by mainstream consumer public. .

Problems loom: 2019 and Magic Leap shifts its focus to selling its products to companies in the health care, industrial and financial sectors to survive. It began talks to sell the company, holding a view of a valuation of US$10B after an IPO soon to come. The sales is seen as an exit option for investors.Tech companies have been placing bets on the promise of augmented reality products. . A sale is unlikely for a few reasons. The scalability of the company’s technology could be an issue. Magic Leap does not own a lot of the integral sofrware patents. Mainstream adoption is a few years away which means buyers need to have financial capacity to carry the products for several years as AR technology evolves. 

Mega Leap had talks with Facebook and Johnson & Johnson which did not progress to deal talks. 


Then covid-19 pandemic struck. Magic Leap cut its workforce by half, letting go 1,000 employees. In May 2020 investors had to pump in US$500M emergency fund. CEO Rony Abovitz is stepping down.


Why do investors like Temasek keep pouring big money into firms like Magic Leap?

Because they missed out on the Virtual Reality wave, they don't want to miss Augmented Reality wave. The financial wheelers and dealers think they understand the technology but never have the tech sector bona fides and are really only throwing darts hoping to hit a potential success.

Consumers rejected Google Glass and HoloLens. Did Temasek really think consumers want to pay US$2.300 for Magic Leap One and walk around wearing googles the whole day long?


Investment watch:
It's game over. Magic Leap is in survival mode. Is this still carried in the books in Temasek? How much is the investment? My estimate -- US$750m.



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Sunday, July 26, 2020

Temasek Tracking -- Hello Inc




2012  Founded
2015  Temasek led funding for US$40M raised US$20M

It's a single product company. It produced a sleep tracker called "Sense" that tracks the noise, light, humidity, and temperature in the user’s bedroom.

The founder is James Proud who is a Peter Thiel Fellow.

Peter Thiel is the billionaire founder of Paypal. The Peter Thiel Fellowship offers college kids US$100,000 if they will drop out of college and take their idea to go create something -- start a company, build anything.


The 'Sense' sleep tracker is the kind of new techy life sciences products that Temasek likes. In the Temasek led funding round 2015 the valuation was put at about US$250M. Total disclosed funding was US$52.9M.

Hello managed to ship their products. In 2017 Hello Inc decided to sell their assets to Fitbit but the deal was not consumed. They continued to find buyers. The company has closed but their website is still available. 

Temasek's invesment numbers are unknown.


Investment Watch:
The monies gone. How much is unknown. Is it still in Temasek's books?





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Temasek Tracking - Ola


2010 Founded
2018 Temasek bought US$225m from investors

Valuation is anybody's guess. In a 2019 funding round it was valued at US$7B.

It is a ride-hailing platform with operations in India, Australia, and London which opened recently 2019. It is a rival to Uber, the biggest ride-hailing company in India. In London, it received a boost when competitior Uber lost it's license due to regulatory breaches.

Group comprises :

- ANI Technologies (parent)
- Ola Fleet Technologies -- Cab-leasing business under Ola Cab brand
- Panda Food India -- food delivery company acquired in 2017
- Vogo -- scooter sharing startup  (invested US$100m in 2018)
- Ola Money Postpaid -- mobile platform for credits to Ola riders
- Ola Financial Services -- financial services arm hived off parent company

Ola plans for IPO within 24 months time. On group basis, Ola is still making losses, especially in food delivery and vehicle leasing.

Although it is considered a later stage venture capital funding status, Ola has a mission for a million electric vehicles on the road by 2021. This warrants further excessive funding requirements.

Prospects:
Both Uber and Ola are seeing ridership growth declining drastically. It has reached saturation for point-to-point cab-hailing.  Ola has seen growth of 90% in 2016, 57% in 2018 and 20% in 2018. A lot of it has to do with driver incentive schemes.  In 2019 growth was down to single-digit. The prime reason for the steep decline in growth is due to savage cuts in driver incentives leading to cabbies switching back their previous jobs before they took up Ola-driving.

With its core ride-hailing growth stagnating, Ola is betting on electric mobility, financial services and food delivery through cloud kitchens to drive growth and profitability in the long term.

Temasek investment:
In 2018 Temasek bought single-digit chunk of shares for US$225m. The acquisition was from the secondary market and sellers appeared to be founder members. Again, Temasek invest in lost making company and provide for founders to divest and make hefty gains. It's an investment where the money doe'nt go into the floundering business, but into the pockets of founders who are reducing their risks.

Temasek is also currently negotiating with Ola’s management to invest more money in the cab aggregator by way of subscription to new shares. Media reports claimed that Ola was in discussions with Temasek and other investors to raise about $1 billion.

The core technology is the ride-hailing app. Unlike Uber which is the technology game, Ola is the technology app and a whole host of brick and mortar plays. Life changing technologies is one of Temasek's theme investment target. Is Temasek missing the wood for the trees.

INVESTMENT WATCH:
In the last fund raising in 2019 for US$500M, Ola had no showcase of high revenue growth numbers to pitch. Instead, it positioned itself as a profitable startup, soon to IPO, and lucrative international markets in UK and Australia and niches in India. There were few takers. The shimmer is gone.

No ride-hailing model in the world is making money. They are all burning cash. Ola has extremely ambitious plans for 1 million electric vehicles.  With plans for 1 million electric vehicles, it looks like massive massive funding ahead. Meanwhile, reports suggest the industry has reached saturation point. Having missed out at the startup phase, Temasek looks keen to build up its stake.

Watch out for IPO within 24 months time.

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Temasek Tracking - CardioDX Inc


2004 Founded
2011 Funding round US$140mm
2012 US Medicare agreed to cover Corus CAD test kit
2012 Funding round US$58 (Temasek joined)
2014 Funding round US$76.3m
2014 IPO cancelled
2017 Funding round US$22.7m
2018 Medicare pulled its coverage on Corus CAD
2019 Closed

A medical diagnostics company developed its flagship product Corus CAD, a blood test kit for heart diseases priced at US$1,195 each.

It sold millions of dollars worth of the test over the course of six years until Medicare in November stopped paying for it. At least 175,000 patients have used the test, the company has said.

In 2015 accusations began to surface that the company knew the test was medically unnecessary Two former employees filed lawsuit that the company had defrauded Medicare out of US$39m to US$53m between 2012 and 2018.

Medicare pulled its coverage in late 2018 after deciding that the test kit is not really valuable. Industry insiders said it was highly unusual for Medicare to take so long in their evaluation. Once the insurance coverage is gone, it was the death knell for CardioDX Inc. In January 2019, the company abruptly shut down.

How much money Temasek poured in is unknown. It should appear somewhere in the 2019 financial statement under investment write-off.

Investing in a one product company and untested bio-science product, is super high risk. And Temasek is hungry for pharma startups.


INVESTMENT WATCH :  It's gone!  Watch the write-off in 2020 financials.


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Saturday, July 25, 2020

Temasek Tracking - Cainaio Smart Logistics Networks


Formed : 2013

One of the largest unicorn in China and currently valued at US$20B..

It was formed by Alibaba in 2013 together with 2 investors. Jack Ma's idea was a platform that consolidates the country’s fragmented logistics sector, using big data technology to improve efficiency of parcel delivery. Cainiao used an asset-light model that eschewed expensive warehouse construction, operating in partnership with a dozen shipping companies that carry out deliveries with 2 million people across 600 cities.

Partly to overcome US regulator's questions on the consolidation of Cainiao's financials in Alibaba's books, the latter lifted its holdings from 47% to 51% in 2017. As a subsidiary, the financials will now be consolidated. But it now sinks Alibaba deeper into setting up and controlling its own infrastructure for the delivery network. It sees higher capitalisation needs and has committed another 100 billion Yuan to expand the network in the next 5 years.

Cainiao contribute 4% Alibaba's revenue, but it is still a heavy loss making delivery company.

Recently, one of the original 3 startup investors, Fosum International, has started negotiating with Alibaba to exit the company, putting the valuation at about US$20B.

Temasek and GIC bought into the startup in a 2016 fuding round. It is not known what the total investment is.

Put this on the WATCH LIST because :

Cainiao has been piling up losses. It's model has shifted from a tech-heavy platform into the regular heavy infrastructure delivery business. Alibaba is now the biggest shareholder in a company essentially providing the logistical support to it's parent, and Temasek's equity share is diminishing. No easy exit strategy.

July 2020

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Temasek Tracking - Asia Capital Reinsurance



Founded : 2006
Temasek investment: US$200M

Business : Re-isurance. ACR was set up as an independent reinsurer with a pan-Asia focus to address the demands of the fast growing Asian property and casualty insurance industry. It took on large risks segment such as aviation, marine, energy, large infrastructure and engineering projects across Asia.

ACR was founded in 2006 by John Tan, a local veteran in the industry. Founding investors included Khazanan Nasional and other private equity investors, including Hsieh Fu Hua and Koh Boon Hwee. At US$620M it was the largest fund raising in this part of the world at the time.

Both Hsieh and Koh were board members of Temasek Holdings at one time. It is not known at which time Temasek bought into ACR which may represent some conflicts of interest.  Appointments, relationships, family connections are all so intertwined in Singapore Inc, and given the non-transparency surrounding many transactions, everything is up for conjecture. Temasek sank in US$200M it seems not in a funding exercise but buying off some investors' shares.

ACR grew very fast in terms of contracts written and balance sheet growth. In the years 2010/2011 the insurance industry took big hits from natural catastrophes, eg the Thailand flood of 2011. In a very challenged environment of rising natural catastrophe risks in the Asian region, competition, excess insurance capital to demand that puts a downward pressure on pricing, ACR soon struggled with continued underwriting losses and the uncertain outcome of its turnaround strategy. It had a record of missing performance targets and during the past few years it has seen its combined ratio rising and its return on equity dwindling. In 2011 it was put on credit watch by rating agencies which was lifted shortly after capital injection. In 2016, its return was zero.

The eventual failure of ACR follows the familiar path of NOL and Chartered Semiconductors. In the game played by the big boys, in the end there was the lack of deep knowhow and connectedness to carry the business on a sustainable basis. Founder John is an industry vet and touted by many as a trail blazer. But at the same time, there were some whispers of disquiet on his staying power in the projects he undertook.

John Tan retired in 2015 from executive positions so the operation was basically struggling in the hands of financial investors. Major investors are Temasek, Malaysian SWF Khazanah and Marubeni. As early as 2016, investors seek an exit. In a 2017 aborted sales to a Chinese group, the valuation was set at US$1B.

By Dec 2019 a sales to Catalina Holdings was pending regulatory approval. For Catalina, it is a strategically important transaction as it gives them a platform from which to build an Asian portfolio and to complete their geographic footprint. Catalina intends to retain Singapore as a hub to build a strong Asian run-off platform.

The deal amount was not disclosed, but as at Sept 30, 2019, ACR had US$835 million of shareholder equity, US$1.3 billion of gross liabilities including unearned premium reserve, and total assets of US$2.1 billion.


Investment watch :
Selling in a buyers' market, where there were hardly any other takers, valuations is likely to be depressed. Expect substantial losses.

July 2020

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Temasek Tracking - Aiwujiwu



2014  Founded


Iwujiwu was a Chinese online property listings platform for rental and secondary market listing.

Within a span of 18 months, it raised US$300M in 5 funding exercises. In 2017 its valuation was put at US$1B and became known as the fatest growing unicorn in the industry.

It is not known how much Temasek sank into this company.

Iwujiwu is an O2O app (Online-to-offline) that funnels customers to real estate agents. Opened in 2014 it quickly gained 28 percent market share of Shanghai's rental market. The following year, it leased out more than 20,000 homes and rung up US$5.9 billion trade volume. By 2016/2017 competitive business models profilerated, real estate agent-customer monkey dealings, and broader market cooled and macroeconomic uncertainties increased. Investors' cash burnt and the company cut commissions making the situation worst. Within 4 years it had gone from unicorn to bankruptcy.

Weak model : When people make their biggest financial investment in their life time, the process requires significant services, trust, and face-to-face interactions. In addition, as people don’t buy homes very often – unlike the so called high-frequency food takeout or stock trading services, for example – the classic Internet business strategy of user acquisition and value generation did not work well neither.

It seems AIWUJIWU was simply an app. Shanghai Manyi Property Consultancy is the entity that operates the app. Official record shows Deng Wei its founder has backed out as an investor and the company has changed its legal representative from Mei Hong to Zhai Guanmin. Its website has been taken over by a rental agent app called First Floor Landlor. Den Wei is gone and the company nameplate no longer hangs at its former address.

This is a classic case of greed dampening investor prudency. It's the mentality of  "Anything-technology-and-China-I-also-want".


INVESTMENT ALERT:  There has been no official announcement, but it's already game over. We don't know if Temasek has written this off yet.


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Friday, July 24, 2020

Temasek Tracking - Tongdun Technology




2012 Founded
2013 Fundings rounds US$200m
2017 Funding round (Temasek joined)
2019 Police investigation


It's a big data company engaged in data gathering, mining and analysis. It crawls the internet to collect personal information, such as names, locations and phone numbers. Data analytics companies have grown in step with the online loan industry which requires customer data. Lenders purchase data to help them market their loans, identify fraudulent borrowers and assist collection of unpaid debts.

Dec 2019 CCTV cited police reports that Tongdun made US$128.5m from sales of personal data to predatory online loan sharks. If that is not shocking enough, the US$126.5m was the company's reported total revenue for 2018.

Chinese police are cracking down on data companies that sell personal information to predatory lenders. Warrants of arrest has been issued to CEOs of two other companies.

Temasek's total investment is not known. Temasek co-led the 2017 funding round which raised US$72.8m.


INVESTMENT WATCH :  Red alert.


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Temasek Tracking - Making Sense Of Risks

" It must sometimes seem to Singaporeans that the management of Temasek and GIC have an unerring ability to find every banana skin in the room and promptly slip up on it." ... Kenneth Jeyeratnam blog (2012) 
With wisdom from hindsight it is easy to critique an investment decision and where the deal has gone terribly wrong, to bollock the decision maker. Then again, how is one supposed to take stock of the never ending tales of disasters by Temasek. Or are the failures simply accentuated because successes are seldom publicised as a matter of propriety. 

This is a series of blogs that highlight Temasek's assets which have floundered or appear to be floundering. The blog Temasek Tracking - Portfolio compilation is an attempt at recording an inventory of investments. Troubled assets are highlighted with a link to a microblog on each relevant investment.

Temasek started off investing under the mantle of national development. Where the mission is national development, elements of subsidy pervades and funding agency bottomline is never impressive as it is not meant to be. An example is the ill-fated Chartered Semiconductor Mfg in 1990s where Temasek lost billions doing national service investment.

It has moved away from 'big bang deals' of the past, where it has gone in to take substantial positions and controlling stakes in companies. As a supranational entity, there will always be suspicion of non-market motives for their acquisitions. The risk of igniting political-economic ripples in the target host country is high.  Such was the case in the 2006 accquisition of Thai Prime Minister's Shin Corp. Coming at a time of corruption allegation against the PM, Thais believed Thaksin Shinawatra took massive profits from an over-priced sale, but defaulted on taxes. It caused a serious diplomatic rift and burning of Singapore flags in Bangkok and sealed the downfall of the PM.

Traditional investors follow the 60:40 principle of investment. This suggests a 60% portfolio on equities and 40% fixed income government securities. The idea is the lower but fixed return on securities will balance out the higher but more volatile returns on equities. A Schroeder's study has found that the 60:40 method has proven very successful. But the low interest rates of the past decade has meant the 40% fixed revenue is no longer sufficient to balance out the volatility of equities earnings. Temasek is no traditionalist. It has a much higher risk appetite than GIC.

Ho Ching, wife of the Prime Minister, was appointed CEO in 2004. She came with a checquered engineering background. The new CEO immediately set about modernising and re-energising Temasek into what is today a well-respected sovereign wealth fund managing a portfolio of S$306B with 800 employees and 11 global offices. There is no doubt the infrastructure of Temasek today is her legacy. But as to how much value she actually created requires much financial analysis which is not the matter for this blog.

Fair or not, many of the older generation remembers her for the very first 'big bang' deal in the acquisition of Micropolis which resulted in a loss of S$500M. She has come a long way since. Temasek has diversified geographically so it is no longer impacted solely by Singapore economy. The US is an important target but entry timed in an era of high valuation seems foreboding. In the case of China, Temasek picked up assets in their post boom era. As China's economy cools, startups flounder. Some industry experts warn 90% of many Chinese tech startups will fail. Holding the view that India is on the cusp of their economic breakout, Temasek wants to get in pre-boom. With a highly bureaucratic India, it fuels suspicion that Singapore eased up on labour mobility policies in the CECA (FTA) signed in 2005 to facilitate Temasek's entry into the sub-continent. Latin America and Africa are two regions that are also in Temasek's lenses, two regions where it has very little experience.

Temasek does not manage risk the traditional way of setting limits or targets for asset class, country, sector, theme or single name concentration. One can assume neither does it have limits for other risk parameters like liquidity, currency and interest rate sensitivities. These are time-tested risk management regimes that all central banks impose on financial institutions in their jurisdiction, as do the MAS.

Instead, it approaches risk management on some VAR or Value At Risk methodology that employs fanciful algorithms. VAR in simple terms is the amount of cash a fund may lose in a given time frame in the event of a major downturn. 

Its investment philosophy is a long term horizon and with this it is prepared to take short term negative returns in some years in expectation of higher returns in the longer term. It retains a risk appetite to take concentrated positions, in other words, 'big bang' deals are still possible.

Temasek has shredded its image of a gangling sovereign investment arm. It has left behind the comprador, brick and mortar management style and brought in Wall Street type wheelers and dealers. In a world of frothy investment dollars due to decades of easy money policies by central banks globally, the liquidity increases capital competition on the supply side. Temasek puts its funds into more high risk deals in search of higher returns. It has become more of a Venture Capitalist, seeking out the the next Alibaba, Paypal, or Amazon.

Temasek's investment is predominantly in equities, both listed and unlisted private companies. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, it suffered a bruising loss of US$5B in a somewhat panic divestment of holdings in Barclays, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America. In classic contrast of impeccable timing, Warren Buffet picked up the BOA shares and made US$2B in one year. Temasek has since moved away form putting capital into established financial institutions and turned towards projects centered on technology, logistics, media and life sciences sectors. It is also into fund of funds and running its own private equity firms. It has since spawned several private equity companies that operate on leveraged basis. Outstanding bonds aggregate S$15B at March 2020. Temasek no doubt, sees itself in the company of great money management houses like Blackrock, Vanguard Group, UBS, Fidelity, etc. In simple layman terms, the focus has veered away from seeking rock steady stocks that provide a respectable income stream and reasonable capital appreciation, and instead has gone into forward looking mode in trying to outsmart the market by identifying tomorrow's winners. It is in the nature of taking bets, although a calculated one, but nevertheless, they are bets.

The sovereign wealth fund is now a true blue VC fund, pumping seemingly unlimited money into startups that use cash-burning models.  It now regularly leads funding rounds as the startups go into their A, B, C and D series of fund raising for their seemingly unsatiable need for cash to burn. Even as the cash burns and the companies' losses have no end in sight, their valuation is put in an elevator heading for the topfloor. The unicorns, those with US$1B valuation, take centre stage, often with a flamboyant founder who gives presentations in their bermudas, soon in flip flops, and likely travels in private jets purchased with investor money. These companies never turn in a single dollar profit for years, but VCers will point to Amazon which made its first profit after a decade of losses and is now a US1 trillion company. For as long as the startups are on the books, it's all about valuation. And valuation in this case, has nothing to do with International Financial Reporting Standards. It is based on investor expectations. How these expectations are translated into the bottomline is rather foggy. 

Today, as Temasek manages a S$306B portfolio, should conservative Singaporeans look at the SWF with awe, esteem, or with a tinge of concern. Afterall, invesTment 101 cautions pensioners to place their bets on lesser risks and be satisfied with a lower but steady return. Should the nation's interest be better served for reserves to be managed more conservatively? The failures at Neptune Orient Lines and Chartered Semiconductors have demonstrated that when playing with big boys, one needs depth of knowledge in the game. Can Singapore's aristocrats thow up several more Ho Chings in the years ahead? Dilhan Pillay Sandrasegara, currently the CEO of Temasek International, is possibly being groomed to take over from Ho Ching. For all his credentials and expertise, Dilham does not have a drop of blue blood in him. As an outsider of the Singapore aristocrat family. does he have the standing to ride out political storms from billion dollar losses the way Ho Ching is able to? Unlikely.
Read: Temasek plans to make its presence felt 
Perhaps the greatest risk is the company itself and its management culture. Deals are many, varied, humongous and cover a wide spectrum of investment types. Afterall, the CEO once quipped, it's a game where players must have 'balls'. At any one time, there is probably a hundred deals at various stages of processing.  Temasek seems to be in a hurry and running on steroids. 

The Ministry of Finance is the sole shareholder of Temasek, but it cuts the fund loose to operate as a private exempt company. The independence of the company is a sensitive issue and MOF has persistently insisted the cabinet does not interfere with the operation of Temasek. The independence and sovereignty factor impedes Temasek's cross border dealings where national interest may be raised by target's domicile country. Ministerial supervision is surrendered in deference to market sensitivity.

A high level insider once explained there is no risk committee at board level. He said with reference to Temasek : “Every commercial organization of any reasonable scale, and in particular financial institutions, simply must have a dedicated risk management committee of the board that is fully independent of management. To not do so is simply playing Russian Roulette and is inexcusable in today’s volatile era and in light of the recent financial crisis ”.


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Temasek Tracking - Portfolio Compilation

" It must sometimes seem to Singaporeans that the management of Temasek and GIC have an unerring ability to find every banana skin in the room and promptly slip up on it." ... Kenneth Jeyeratnam blog (2012) 
Jeyeratnam made reference to failed investments by Temasek and GIC. To do justice to the sovereign wealth funds, this blog attempts to list Temasek's portfolio and identify troubled assets. Do note the following:-

1. This is an ongoing effort. It is a work-in-progress.
2. It is not a comprehensive list. 

3. The investments may be booked in Temasek, or any of its subsidiary investment vehicles, or in its operating subsidiaries.
4. Past investments since divested are included.
5. Troubled assets are highlighted in red. Click for microblog on the relevant investment.

The asset review avoids criticism of the investment decision since the circumstances of the time is unknown and every acquisition is subject to risks as yet unknown. It merely lays out the reason for marking the asset as a troubled item. However, where there are very obvious clearcut lapses of focus in the decision making, it will be highlighted. This seems a fair approach to take in a post-fact review. 

Note:
(a). Want to be informed when a new microblog of troubled asset is published? Simply submit your email in the box on the top, right. Your privacy will be respected. The author has no other use for your email.

(b). If you like to see updates in this portfolio list, bookmark this page and check back.


Updated as at :    24 Nov 2020
Date started    :    24 Jul 2020


Country : CHINA


(Status: Series denotes the last round of funding)

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
17Zuoye
Edu: Online platform for K-12
2005
?
>
Series E

iTutor
Edu : Online on-demand tutoring
1998
?
Huge
late vc

Columbia-China
Life Sciences: Healthcare Fund
2013
2016
US$ 250M


Accuragen
Life Sciences:  Cancer Diagnostics
2013
?
?
Series B








Aier Eye Hospital Group
Life Sciences: Eye hospital
2001
2019
US$ 2.0B
Public

China Biological Products
Life Sciences: Biopharmaceitical company
1989


Public


Life Sciences: 





Meiluan Dianping
Lifestyles: On-demand food delivery
2010
2016
Huge
Public

Mafengco
Lifestyles: Online travel guide
2006
2017
?
Series D

Lifestyles: Online leisure travel
2006
2013
US$129m
Public
2018-20
Lifestyles: O2O property rental
2014
?
?
Bombed

Tudou Holdings
Lifestyles: Online video sharing
2004
2010
US$35M
M&A
2016
Kuaishou
Lifestyles: Online video sharing
2911


Series E

Didi Chuxing
Lifestyles: Taxi-hailing
2012
?
Huge
late vc

Lifestyles: E-commerce
2007
2011
?
Series G

Cloudary
Lifestyles: E-book platform
2004

?
M&A

G7 Networks
Logistics: Iot fleet mgmt
2008
2016
?
late vc

Shanghai Yupei Group
Logistics: Owns several warehouses
2000

?
LBO

Logistics: (Alibaba-owned)
2013
?
huge
?

MiningLamp
AI: Big data mining analytics
2014


Series E

Rokid
AI: manufactures family robots
2013




Sensetime
AI: visual & facial recognitionl technlogy
2014


Series D

Fintech: Big data analytics
2012
2013
US$ 200M
Police inv

Rong 370
Fintech: online platform loan search
2011
2014
?
Public

21Vianet
Tech: Internet data center services provider
1996

?
Public

Cheetah Mobile
Tech: Software app developer
2009

?
Public

Energy: Integrated oil & gas services
1994
2012
HK$4.2T
Public

AS Watson
Others: Convenience store chain
1841
2014
US$5.7B
Pte

Others: Electric autonous vehicles
2014
2018
US$258M
Public
Partly
Xiaom
Others: Smart phones & IoT products





Others: Co-sharing workspace
2017
2018
?
Series B

















Country : INDIA

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
Cartrade
Lifestyles: Used car auction platform
2006
2007
US$140m
Series H

Curefit
Lifestyles: Health & fitness
2016
2020
US$100M
Series D2

PolicyBazaar
Lifestyles: Digital insurance
2008
2018
US$13.85M
late vc

Lifestyles: Online marketplace
2010
2014
US$53m
late vc

Lifestyles: Ride-hailing
2010
2018
US$225M
Series J

Zomato
Lifestyles: On demand food delivery
2009




Manthan Software
AI: Data analytics
2004
2018
?
Series D

Billdesk
Fintech: Payments platform
2000
2005
?
M&A

Pine Labs
Fintech: Payments processor
1998
2018
?
Pte

Dr Argawal's Healthcare
Life Sc: Hospital chain
1957
2019
US$38M
Pte

Healthcare Global
Life Sc: Multi-specialty hospitals
1989
2013
US$25.7M
Public

Asia Healthcare Hldg
Life Sc: Invest healthcare biz
2016
2018
US$50M
Pte

Medreich
Life Sc: Pharmaceutical co
1994


M&A








Star Agriwarehousing Mgmt
Agri: Integrated post-harvest mgmt svc
2006
2014
US$120M
Pte

Godrej Agrovet
Agri: Agribusiness and animal feed
1991
2012
US$140M
Public
Part
ICICI Prudential
Others: General insurance
2000
2020
US$111.5M
Public

Others: Indian infra project fund
2015
2018
US$400M
Pte

FirstFlight Courier
Others: Courier services
1986
2007
?
Pte
to exit
Godfrej Consumer
Others: H/hold, personal care prod
1897
2012
?
Public
Part
Others: Others
1992
2010
US$150
Pte

Others: Telecommunications
1995
-
-
Public
NA
AU Small FinanceBank
Others: Banking
1998
2018
US$147m
Public


Country : US

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
AirBnB
Lifestyles: Online vacation rental
2008




Harry's
Lifestyles: E-commerce men personal grooming
2012


M&A

DoorDash
Lifestyles: Food delivery platform
2013


Series H

Rent The Runway
Lifestyles: Fashion rentall
2009
2018
US$200M
Loan

Wish
Lifestyles: Mobile E-commerce app
2011
2017
?
Series H

Lifestyles: Sleep tracking device
2012
2015
?
Closed

ClassPass
Lifestyles: Fitness & Health
2012
2018
?
Series E

Roblox
Lifestyles: Online games created by users
2004

?
Series F

Life Sc: Pharmaceutical
1992
2015
US$196M
Public
2018
Amyris
Life Sc: Synthetic biology prod
2003

US$47.8M
Public

Biomarin
Life Sc: Pharmaceutical
1997


Public

Homology Medicines
Life Sc: Gene therapy
2015
2018
?
Public

Biovex
Life Sc: Biopharmaceutical
1999

?
M&A

Iora Health
Life Sc: Primary healthcare svc
2011
2016
?
Series F

Coherus Biosciences
Life Sc: Biotheraupetics cmpany
2010

?
Public

Life Sc: Gnenomic diagnistics
2004
2012

Closed

Portula Pharmaceuticals
Life Sc: Clinical biotechnology co
2003
2011
?
M&A
2020
Visterra
Life Sc - Biopharmaceutical co
2007
2014
?
M&A
2018
Impossible Food
Life Sc: Plant-based meat substitute
2011
2017
?
late vc

Califia Farms
Life Sc: Plant-base bevearages
2010

?
late vc

Zipline
Life Sc: Drone delivery for medicines
2011


Series D

Guardant Health
Life Sc: Precision oncology 
2012


Public

Vir Biotechnology
Life Sc: clinical stage immunology co
2016
2020


Public
Vielo Bio
Life Sc: clinical stage biotechnology co 
2017
2020

Public

IQVIA Company
Life Sc: aggregated health dada provider 
1982


Public

Clean Energy Fuels Corp
Energy: NG marketer and retailer 
1997


Public

Energy: Fracking services company
2002
2011
US$1.33B
Public

Energy: Oil exploration & production
2011
2012
Huge
Closed
2019
Energy: LNG terminal and marketing
1983
2012
US$218m
Public
2013
..
Energy: 





Mosaic Co
Agri: Fertiliser mgf
2004

Public


AI: Augment reality technology
2011
2018
Huge
Bad

Flux Factory Inc
Tech: Data exc for bldg designs
2012
2015
?
Series B

Global Healthcare Exchange
Tech: Supply chain mgmt - health sector
2000

?
Pte

Farmers Business Network
Tech: Argronomic info network
2014

?
Series E

Tech: Video games developer
> 2004
2010
?
Closed
>
Pluribus Networks
Tech: Network automation provider
2010
2015
?
Series E

AvidXchange
Tech: Accounts payable processing
2009
2017
?
Series F

Dell Inc
Tech: Computer hardware and software
1984

?
Public

Tech: Multinational telecommunication co
1930
2016
US$2.137B
Public

Bill.com
Tech: Accounts back-office system
2006
2020
?
Public

Sprinklr
Tech: Social media mgmt for companies
2009
2016
> ?
late vc

Marin Software
Tech: Cloud based advertising mgmt
2006
2012
?
Public

Carbon
Tech: 3D technologies
2013
2019
?
Series E

UST Global
Tech: Digital transformation enabler
1998
2018
US$250M
Pte

C2FO
Fintech: Supply chain financing
2008
2015
US$40M
Series G

Flywire
Fintech: Payments processor

2018
?
Series E

Virtu Financial
Fintech - automated trading platform
2008
2014
?
Public

Visa
Fintech - Payments processor
1958

?
Public

Secondmarket
Fintech: Auction platform for illiquid assets
2004
2010
US$7.5M
M&A
2015
Paypal
Fintech: Electronic payment system
1998


Public

Markit Group
Finance: Credit data provider
2003
2013
US$500M
LBO

Finanxe:






Modern Meadow
Others: Biofabricated leather
2011
2018
?
late vc

Unvar Solutions Inc
Others: Chemical & ingredients distributor
1924
2015
US$350M
Public

Evoqua Water Technology
Others: Water treatment solutions
1978


Public

 
Others:







Country : SINGAPORE

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
Advance.ai
AI: Fraud detection, credit scoring platform
2015
?
?
Series C

Others: Re-insurance
2006
?
US$200M
Sold
2020
Health Management Intl
Life Sc: Hospitals in SEA
1998
2017
S$11M
Pte

ASLAN Pharmaceuticals
Life Sc: Biopharmaceutical in cancer drugs
2010
2020

Public

Lazada
Lifestyles: E-commerce
2012
2014
?
Pte

Spacemob
Lifestyles: Co-working space provider
2016
2017
US$5.5M
M&A
2018
Zilingo
Lifestyles: B2B platform for fashion producers
2015
2019

Series D

Lazada
Lifestyles: E-commerce
2012


M&A

Energy: Oil Exploration & production
20082009S$13mPte
2009
















Country : ASIA - OTHERS

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
VN - VNG Corm
Tech: Internet & tech co games devt
2004
2009US$29Mlate vc

VN - Vinhomrs
Property: Real est developer
2008
2019?Public

VN - 






ID - HappyFresh
Lifestyles: Online grocery delivery
2014
2015?Series C

ID - Gojek
Lifestyles: Ride-hailing
2010
2018Huge
Series F

ID - Tokopedia
Lifestyles: E-commerce
2009
2020USD500mlate VC

TW - Gogoro
Others: Electric bike mfg
20112017?Series C
TW:






Others: Telecommunication, airlines
19832006Thb151BPublic2011-19


Country : EUROPE

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
UK - Funding Circle
Fintech: Online peer-to-peer lending
2010
2015
£30M
Public

UK - FNZ (Finextra)
Fintech: IT service provider
2004
2020
?
Pte

UK - 






UK - BenevolentAI
AI: Computational medicine technology
2013
2017
?
Pte

UK - IHS Markit
Finance: Financial information svc provider
1959

M&A

UK - Improbable Worlds
Tech: OS platform for simulation
2012
2017
?
Series B

UK - Farfetch
Lifestyles: platform luxury goods buy/sell
2007

?
Public

UK - Eros International
Lifestyles: Indian film production / distribution
1988

?
Public

UK - Orchard Theurapeutics
Life Sc: Biopharmaceutical company
2015

?
Public

FR - Gaztransport & Technigas
Energy: Services to LNG storage/transport
1994
2014
10.4%
Public

FR - Alan
Lifestyles: Digital Insurance
2016
2020
?
Series C

DE - Omio
Lifestyles: Travel aggregator
2012
2018
?
Series D

DE - GetYourGuide
Lifestyles: Online tour-search platform
2009

?
Series E

NO - Origo Exploration
Energy: Oil exploration in Norwegian sea
2014
2014
€95M
M&A
2017
IT - Moncler SpA
Lifestyles: branded luxury outerwear
1952


Public

NL - Adyen
Fintech: Payment processor
2006


Public

NL - NN Group
Finance: Insurance company
2013
2014
€525M
Public

CH - Gategroup Holdings
Others: Airline catering
1992
2019
???
Pte



Country : LATIN AMERICA

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
AR - IguanaFix
Lifestyles: E-commerce home improvement
2013
2016
Low
late  vc

Lifestyles: E-commerce sports goods
2000
2012
R$113M
M&A
2019
BR - Virgi Mobile Latin Am
Telcom: Mobile services provider
2010
2014
?
early vc










Country : AFRICA

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
Energy: Oil & gas exploration services
2004
2014
US$120m
Pte
2019
ZA - Airtel Africa
Telcom: Mobile service provider
1998

>
Public

Others : Mining
2004
2010
US$135m
Pte










Country : OTHER COUNTRIES

Asset
Business
Found
Invest
Amount
Status
Divest
Others: Global mining company
1993
2012
US$1.3b
Public
2019
Others - Restaurants19902018???Pte

Others - Restaurants
2010
2014
US$100m
Public
2017
Energy: Oil & gas exploration services
2006
2010
US$400m
Pte



Read the cover blog TEMASEK TRACKING - MAKING SENSE OF RISKS