For years, Singapore has managed very efficiently with a manual voting system. Our elections have generally been very orderly and subdued. The only excitement has been the 2 or 3 occasions when ruling party candidates wondered into prohibited areas and we were educated by the strange judiciary wisdom that 'within' the area is not 'near' the area.
Of course, that does not preclude the use of technology where the cost benefits make sense. We are now digitising certain aspects of the voting system. In the main, it pertains to availability of services to candidates. For voters, it is the introduction of electronic registration at voting stations. In fact, I have always wondered why this function has never been automated in the past 30 years. It's a relatively simple app to code.
There are some issues I like to raise, for which concerned parties should either pursue further or provide some answers.
Foremost, on the dollars and cents. The new electronic registration employs scanners from Smartmatic. On electronic registration, it would be useful if we can have an idea of how much the Smartmatic contract was. If all a Smartmatic machine does is to scan NRIC and register voters, I am confident any smart young student in our junior colleges could have coded an equally efficient and secure app to satisfy the requirements at a tiny fraction of the cost. There is certainly no need for a mission specific equipment that will be used one day every 4 years. Those with a quick mind must have guessed my real question. Are there any other functions for these Smartmatic machines besides registering the voters? If so, what are these?
In a recent Pennsylvannia Senate Republican lawmaker public hearing into claims of election fraud, retired army colonel Phil Waldronm, who had served in cyber warfare units, said : "The voting systems in the US and in Pennsylvania were built to be manipulated. They’ve been used in elections around the world, in stolen elections around the world, in Venezuela, Italy, Argentina, Singapore, Bolivia as close as two weeks ago." The colonel has cast aspersion on the integrity of our election system and it behoves on our government to make a public statement to clarify the matter to Singaporeans. None was forthcoming on a matter so serious. Our national reputation has been blemished but instead of a strong rebuttal, we are treated to the circus of a prime minister protecting his personal reputation in 2 simultaneous libel cases in the courts. Or perhaps, with their superior cyber intel, the US knows something and a rebuttal may open up Pandora's box.
The following stakeholders should have participation in the implementation of an electronic voting system :
1. An independent Election Agency
2. The ruling party
3. The opposition parties
4. The public
We have no independent election agency. The Election Department manages the Singapore election and it resides in the Prime Minister's Office. (1) and (2) are one and the same. We have no public representation. Surely a parliamentary discussion of an electoral reform on the question of an independent election agency and a civic overseeing body, has more national interest than second hand smoking on balconies.
In the absence of a civic overseeing body, it is incumbent on the opposition parties to assume heightened responsibility on the implementation of an electronic voting system. In our big government nanny state, the government consistently blindsides us with developments without public input. We are once again presented with a fait accompli.
The election chaos in the US should teach us some lessons with respect to the use of electronic voting systems. The nonchalant way the various states treated systems and process security is bewildering to say the least. No doubt our use for only electronic registration is not as complicated as the US voting system. Nevertheless there are implementation protocols that we should adhere to.
Both ruling and opposition parties must review the machine hard codes and application source codes independently of each other. If satisfied, the machines and software are certified. Any revision requires a fresh audit and recertification.
Audit tests should be independently conducted by stakeholders. After which, the audit reports should be filed. Only after a green light is forthcoming from the audit reports of stakeholders can the electronic registration system go live.
In light of the distrust of the Smartmatic and Dominion names generated by the US election, opposition must satisfy themselves that the machines have no other data files except pre-election voter information, there is no communication devices whether built-in or external.
The use of the voter signing pen raises some concerns. It could well be for the sole purpose of marking the ballots as explained. That's well and good. The signing pen certainly facilitates the scanning of votes. That would mean our votes will be harvested and voting data-base maintained. This calls a revisit of the issue of vote privacy once again. I'm quite certain if these are archived, it will not be for the purpose of selective service denials. It would be to facilitate gerrymandering. Opposition members must ascertain how will counted ballots be controlled and that there is no post election scanning of votes. This can only be satisfied with the source code reviews.
What I am suggesting is that stakeholders can no longer be passive onlookers, sidelined to a systems and process tour and some hands holding on the functionality. Instead, they have to be active participants in the future developments of the electoral process.
Of course, that does not preclude the use of technology where the cost benefits make sense. We are now digitising certain aspects of the voting system. In the main, it pertains to availability of services to candidates. For voters, it is the introduction of electronic registration at voting stations. In fact, I have always wondered why this function has never been automated in the past 30 years. It's a relatively simple app to code.
There are some issues I like to raise, for which concerned parties should either pursue further or provide some answers.
Foremost, on the dollars and cents. The new electronic registration employs scanners from Smartmatic. On electronic registration, it would be useful if we can have an idea of how much the Smartmatic contract was. If all a Smartmatic machine does is to scan NRIC and register voters, I am confident any smart young student in our junior colleges could have coded an equally efficient and secure app to satisfy the requirements at a tiny fraction of the cost. There is certainly no need for a mission specific equipment that will be used one day every 4 years. Those with a quick mind must have guessed my real question. Are there any other functions for these Smartmatic machines besides registering the voters? If so, what are these?
In a recent Pennsylvannia Senate Republican lawmaker public hearing into claims of election fraud, retired army colonel Phil Waldronm, who had served in cyber warfare units, said : "The voting systems in the US and in Pennsylvania were built to be manipulated. They’ve been used in elections around the world, in stolen elections around the world, in Venezuela, Italy, Argentina, Singapore, Bolivia as close as two weeks ago." The colonel has cast aspersion on the integrity of our election system and it behoves on our government to make a public statement to clarify the matter to Singaporeans. None was forthcoming on a matter so serious. Our national reputation has been blemished but instead of a strong rebuttal, we are treated to the circus of a prime minister protecting his personal reputation in 2 simultaneous libel cases in the courts. Or perhaps, with their superior cyber intel, the US knows something and a rebuttal may open up Pandora's box.
The following stakeholders should have participation in the implementation of an electronic voting system :
1. An independent Election Agency
2. The ruling party
3. The opposition parties
4. The public
We have no independent election agency. The Election Department manages the Singapore election and it resides in the Prime Minister's Office. (1) and (2) are one and the same. We have no public representation. Surely a parliamentary discussion of an electoral reform on the question of an independent election agency and a civic overseeing body, has more national interest than second hand smoking on balconies.
In the absence of a civic overseeing body, it is incumbent on the opposition parties to assume heightened responsibility on the implementation of an electronic voting system. In our big government nanny state, the government consistently blindsides us with developments without public input. We are once again presented with a fait accompli.
The election chaos in the US should teach us some lessons with respect to the use of electronic voting systems. The nonchalant way the various states treated systems and process security is bewildering to say the least. No doubt our use for only electronic registration is not as complicated as the US voting system. Nevertheless there are implementation protocols that we should adhere to.
Both ruling and opposition parties must review the machine hard codes and application source codes independently of each other. If satisfied, the machines and software are certified. Any revision requires a fresh audit and recertification.
Audit tests should be independently conducted by stakeholders. After which, the audit reports should be filed. Only after a green light is forthcoming from the audit reports of stakeholders can the electronic registration system go live.
In light of the distrust of the Smartmatic and Dominion names generated by the US election, opposition must satisfy themselves that the machines have no other data files except pre-election voter information, there is no communication devices whether built-in or external.
The use of the voter signing pen raises some concerns. It could well be for the sole purpose of marking the ballots as explained. That's well and good. The signing pen certainly facilitates the scanning of votes. That would mean our votes will be harvested and voting data-base maintained. This calls a revisit of the issue of vote privacy once again. I'm quite certain if these are archived, it will not be for the purpose of selective service denials. It would be to facilitate gerrymandering. Opposition members must ascertain how will counted ballots be controlled and that there is no post election scanning of votes. This can only be satisfied with the source code reviews.
What I am suggesting is that stakeholders can no longer be passive onlookers, sidelined to a systems and process tour and some hands holding on the functionality. Instead, they have to be active participants in the future developments of the electoral process.