THERE CAN BE NO OTHER EXPLANATION FOR AIR INDIA CRASH OTHER THAN A FORCED ROTATION

One June 12, a few minutes after flight AI171 took off from the runway at Ahmedabad Interntional Airport, it 'dropped' out of the sky and crashed into several building causing a casualty count of 241 from the plane and 28 from the ground. 1 passenger had a miraculous escape.

There are basically 4 ways the plane could have caused the crash:
* Mechanical failure
* Pilot mistake
* Birds
* Contaminated fuel
* Maintenance issues
Weather is ruled out as it was a fine day.

The mention of mechanical failure and the condemnation of Boeing cutting corners using cheap Indian labour and resourcing from India takes off. AI171 was a Boeing 787 Dreamliner, one of the safest in the world and less than 11 years old. Talk about pilot mistake and folks start talking about 30 minutes to obtain a flying certification in India. The pilot and co-pilots were both Indians. The captain is a vet with 8,300 years under his belt and co-pilot is 2/3 on his way to a captaincy qualification have had 1,000 hours on long haul flights under his belt. They were well-experienced, but of course, human mistake can happen to anyone. Let's get our biases out of the way and look objectively.

Many experts have put forward their opinions that are well-intentioned and conscious of the fact that a proper investigation will provide the final answers. I culled from the internet for some of the most probables and my own input based on some of the things I suggest from critical thinking. In my previous blog  April 13, 2025 on "Trump's tariffs - the great reset ..." I said the most critical part of a flight is the takeoff and experienced pilots are paid a handsome salary for their expertise in handling that safely.

Three basic things to know to help you understand the problems:

1. Boeing 787-8 is a Fly-by-Wire aircraft:
In simple terms - a high tech plane. In this type of plane, electronic systems replace many traditional manual flight controls (like cables and hydraulics). The pilot's inputs are converted into electronic signals which are interpreted by the Flight Control Computer. A pilot's command goes through electronic layers:

Input - sensors - computer - bus - actuator - control surface

When a driver turns the steering wheel of a motor vehicle, he turns the steering column, which rotates the steering gear, steering moves the tie rods thus converting rotary motion into lateral  motion, the tie rods then push/pull the wheels, turning the front wheels left or right on their pivot. In other words, the driver is directly dealing with mechanical movements.

In a 787, to get the plan to fly up, Pilot pulls the yoke which sends signals for a nose-up command, electronic sensors detect movement and sends signal sent to flight control computers (FCC), computer does the necessary computations, then sends electronic (digital) commands to actuators which drive the elevator surfaces, elevators physically deflect upward which pushes the tail down, this causes a hydraulic system to push the nose up.

The vehicle and plane comparison shows the driver is involved physical movements of mechanical parts, the pilot has nothing to do with any mechanical functions. 

In electrical and software-based systems, each layer is a potential failure point. Built-in redundancies, fault detection and backups are safety features.The more complex the integrated system is, the more failure risks, especially in the case of electrical faults, bus errors or logic bugs.Bottom line is, when a pilot experiences a problem, the fault could actually have been started somewhere else. The cockpit instruments could be reading faulty data, for example.

2. Aviation aerodynamics:
Something basic to understand in aviation aerodynamics is the forces working on a plane in flight:
Downward force - This is Gravity pulling the airplane toward the Earth. Weight is the factor.
Upnward force - This is Lift created by the wings as air flows over them. The aerodynamic shape of the wings cause the air above it to have a lower pressure and the air below with a higher pressure what keeps the plane in the air. The lift counters the weight of the plane.
Forward force - This is the Thrust produced by the engines (jet or propeller). It moves the plane through the air.
Backward force - This is the Drag which is caused by air resistance. It opposes thrust and slows the plane down.

This is the position of a plane flying level to the horizon (ground). A few things to note here and three critical angles to understand - Angle of Attack (AoA), Pitch Angle and Flight path angle.

Relative airflow is the resistant of the air as the plane flies through (the backward force).
The flight path is aligned with the relative airflow but in opposite direction.
Longitudinal axis is an imaginary line drawn from the tip of the nose to the tail dissecting the fuselage in half. This line is not necessarily aligned with the cord line, but they are very close. It is always slightly pitched up (tilted) to the flight path so that the angle of attack is positive.
Horizon is the reference line. It remains in position even if the plane is ascending or descending.
The AoA = angle between chord line and relative airflow.
Pitch angle = angle between aircraft's longitudinal axis and the horizon. (not draw to avoid crowding)

Important points about the wing:
The wing curvature is shaped to give it the aerodynamic properties. It is always curved at the top. The curved shape and angle cause the air to speed up and separate slightly on top. The flow of air on top accelerates faster because of the curve. (Bernoulli principle). Because of this, the air pressure on top of the wings drop in relation to the pressure below the wings, giving the plane the lift or upward force. Simultaneously, the wing is pushing air down (Newton's principle), which increases lift.

Important point about the flap:
When the flap is extended, it increases the curvature, thus providing more lift. That is why when it is speeding down the runway, the flaps are extended to get as much lift as possible for takeoff.

How the plane ascends or descends:

To ascent, the pilot pitches the nose up which will tilt the plane's flight path to incline upwards. To descend, pitch the nose down.
To pitch up, the pilot pulls back the yoke which pushes the elevator up. The elevator is connected by a hydraulic system to the nose. When it is depressed, the hydraulic system physically pitches the nose up. At the same time, the horizontal stabiliser tilts down at the tailgate edge. This double action of the nose and horizontal stabiliser crates an upward force at the nose and a downward force at the horizontal stabilisers and the plane pitches up and increase its flight path angle. The reverse happens when the pilot pushes the yoke forward and the plane pitches downwards.

This drawing shows the aircraft pitched up, in ascend. In this picture it is easier to see the 3 critical angles. 
Flight path angle = angle between flight path and horizon. (Flight path aligns with relative airflow, but in different directions)
AoA = angle between the cord line and relative airflow.
Pitch (or nose) angle = angle between the longitudinal axis and relative airflow.

This is where it gets interesting for our purpose here.

In the drawing above, the ascend flight path is stabilised. That means this is the path selected for the plane to continue ascend to desired heights. Note the relative airflow has changed from the drawing when the flight path was level to the horizon. Note also the horizon does not change. So the ascend drawing is exactly the same as the level drawing, except for the horizon. That means when the ascend is stabilised, the 3 critical angles are exactly the same when the plane was flying in level mode.

Imagine a see-saw, when it moves up and down, it is actually rotating on the fulcrum. For the plane, imagine the part where the landing gears or the wheels are, as the fulcrum. So when a plane is pitching, it is rotating till it reaches the desired pitch, or the flight path the pilot wants. The point here is when the plane is 'rotating', it's angle of attack changes.

Mathematically, the AoA = the Pitch angle - Flight path angle. In ascend or descend, the pilot is trying to get an optimum flight path. But he controls only the pitch angle by pulling or pushing the yoke. So the flight path angle is the variable.

Pitch angle - Flight path angle = AoA.

In level flight:
The flight path angle γ = 0°.
The pitch angle might be, say, 3°.
Therefore, AoA = pitch – flight path = 3° – 0° = 3°.

During the pitch-up to climb:
The pilot increases pitch.
Initially, flight path hasn't changed yet. This is because momentum caries the plane on it's same path for a few seconds.
The flight path angle γ = 0° (flight path hasn't change yet).
The pitch angle might be, say, 5°.
Therefore, AoA = pitch – flight path = 5° – 0° = 5°.
So the AoA temporarily increases, possibly exceeding 3°, maybe up to 4–5°.
This transient increase in AoA gives more lift → nose rises → aircraft climbs.

Once climb is stabilized (steady ascent):
Now the flight path angle γ = 2°. (now stabilised)
So: AoA = pitch – flight path = 5° – 2° = 3° → same AoA as in level flight.

Why the AoA is critical:
The AoA of planes is different for different makes and at different phases of flight. The typical AoA of a jet liner when cruising (level flying) is about 2° to 4°, at takeoff is 5° to 12°, and at landing is 8° to 15°. When the AoA gets below or above the band allowed, disaster strikes.
When AoA is too high:
Within the band allowed for the AoA, the air flows smoothly over and follow the curve surface of the wing. The airflow is called 'attached' or laminar flow. If the AoA is too high, the airflow becomes 'separated', ie does not follow the curvature and becomes disrupted and turbulent. At a certain critical point it becomes 'detached' from the wing surface and swirls chaotically. This is called a flow separation. Lift drops drastically, drag increases sharply, the wing stalls (provides no lift). The plane may pitch down, sink or even go into a spin.
When AoA is too low:
There are 3 scenarios.
1. Where there is still thrust, ie engines still working. If AoA is too low but still positive, it is not causing the airflow to 'attach' to the wings. The wings stall, that is, provide no lift. The thrust compensates for lack of lift. The plane can still fly and may even ascend a bit.
2. When there is no thrust (engines failed), or not enough thrust (power generation problem): The angle of attack is low but still positive. The plane will descend in a power-off controlled glide.
3. When AoA is negative: This happens when it goes into too steep a dive. The cord line is now angled below the relative airflow. The wind is not passing over have the curved surface, so the aerodynamics of life is lost. In fact, as the air flows over the back half of the wing, it in fact creates a down force. The plane descends rapidly, possibly uncontrollably.

In my "Trump Tariff Reset" blog I said in a takeoff, if the plane loses lift and descending, experienced pilot will pitch down, similar to going into a dive, which is against human instinct. Why dive when the plane is dropping. The pilot pitch down in order to regain lift. The Indian Air plane wreckage will most certain to show the plane's nose is down, although it should be up as the plane was taking off. That is, if the pilot had acted correctly to save the plane and the mechanisms had worked accordingly.

Unfortunately, even if the pilot had reacted correctly, there was nothing he could do to save the plane because he didn't have sufficient altitude.

Pilot mistakes on takeoff is usually maxing out the AoA. But in the Air India case, the video shows the descend was exactly in the manner in scenario 2. This suggests the engines were out, there was no lift, no thrust. So far, I have not seen any experts pointing this out, the possibility of pilot maxing the AoA out. If so, the question is why. (Of course the engines are out is confirmed by the May day call).

3. What happens during an aircraft takeoff:
The image below is taken of Flighdata24. I edited to enhance reading of altitude, ground speed, legend, and the time (which I have also converted to local time): Other than the 2 plot lines, the other wordings in the chart are inserted by me for explanation. V1 - The Decision Speed. It is the last chance for the pilot to abort the takeoff without the plane shooting past the runway. Co-pilot calls out the speed as plane nears the V1. E.g "90", "100", "V1" 
Vr - The Rotation Speed. Co-pilot calls out "Vr". The 'rotation' here is the reference to the see-saw mentioned above. This is when the pilot starts to rotate the plane to tilt up. Vr is when the captain pulls back the yoke slowly to nose up for lift off. For Boeing 787-8 the pitch at Vr is about 11.5%. The pilot must pitch up slowly to avoid a tail strike, i.e., the tail hitting the runway. At Vr the liftoff starts.
Positive Rate - This is to confirm the aircraft is actually climbing. The vertical speed indicator  shows a positive rate climb (usually more than 500 fpm). Co-pilot monitoring the instrument calls out "Positive rate". An experienced pilot actually has already sensed he is in positive territory.
Gear up - The pilot calls out "Gear Up' and co-pilot pulls the lever to retract the landing wheels. 
V2 - This is the minimum safe climb speed. This is the speed at which the plane can still takeoff even with only one engine functioning. The co-pilot calls out "V2".

These call outs  are made in the cockpit. The co-pilot monitors the instruments and calls out while the pilot flies the plane. The metrics are different for different planes and computed based on many factors like plane model, weight, weather, etc. These series of call outs occur within 2-4 seconds apart (about 10 knots apart).

The May day call was sent out on local time 15.38.51, outside of this chart. This means it was sent almost immediately after the plane started to descend. All those reports about the May day call received about 36 seconds after takeoff doesn't seem correct. It was more like 3-4 minutes after takeoff and the plane has already started to fall..

The runway issue:
Runway 23 is 3,505m (11,499ft). AI171 backtracked to the runway threshold (start) so it could have a longer takeoff roll. All online expressions of opinions and media talked about the V1 which is in relation to speed. No one talks about V1 in relation to the runway. There must be a safety margin on the runway for the plane to slow down in case of an abort decision. The manufacturer, the airport, and Indian Airlines itself each have their regulatory standards for this safety margin specific to plane model and other variables. The airlines themselves naturally have more stringent standards to play safe. I have no information, so I checked AI bots. That distance depends on who one asks. Considering all variables for a 787-8, ChatGPT says about 500m, Deepseek says generally 700-1,000m, absolute minimum is 500m, and Grok says 550-674m. Let's go with the barest minimum of 500m. 

Based on barest minimum safety margin of 500m, that GPmeans if  AI171 has not reached V1 by the 3,000m mark, it must abort the takeoff. AI171 liftoff at the end of the runway with just a few metres to spare!

This is my educated guess (no one has suggested this):
1. Under normal conditions, a 787-8 should Vr at about the 3,000m mark, leaving 500m safety runway. 
2. The pilot understood from previous flight report the plane has some issues with power, so he needed a long runoff. That's why he backtracked to the threshold. Or the plane had a heavy load and he wanted a longer runoff to play safe. Note - heavy weight is not over-weight..
3. The plane has not achieved V1 at the safety mark of 3,000m. This is the most critical point of the flight. What happened here? The investigation should figure out what happened in the cockpit at this point. Was there a distraction?
4. So at 3,000m the engines did not have the power to provide the thrust needed for rotation (Vr). The pilot took the risk to push the plane a bit more to gain thrust. Past the speed decision point V1, he had no choice but to attempt a takeoff right at the end of the runway. In other words, the plane rotated without reaching the required speed.
5. For the pilot to take the risk to continue at Decision Point 3,000m, it could mean instrument reading must be showing at least it is close to the desired speed so the pilot had confidence to take the risk.

I don't know how far back is the 3,000m mark in terms of time, but looking at the Flightdata chart, let's go back say 3 secs estimated where the 3,000m is, the speed is about 25-50 knots. It would be suicidal not to abort. Depending on load and other variables, a 787-8 should Vr between 135-155 knots. The chart shows the Vr at under 100 knots. The pilot could not have been so reckless. It seems more likely the instruments show a Vr closer to the minimum 135 knots, so he took a risk. It suggests some electronic malfunction.

It is very clear to me the pilot took off on a "Forced Vr". The Vr speed has not been reached but he forced the plane up. Technically, the plane can liftoff. But it is very dangerous with high risk of tail strike and insufficient thrust for an efficient climb for the takeoff. Aviation history has shown several disasters from forced Vr. 

In forced rotation the pilot is anxious for more lift so aggressive pitching (higher angle of attack) is often the case. This leads to distortion of airflow into the engine intakes, causing compressor inefficiency or stall, especially in jets. The engine itself isn’t “strained” mechanically — it’s starved or disturbed aerodynamically. Performance drops, and achieving desired thrust becomes a big problem. 

The AI171 takeoff points to a classic profile of a "marginal liftoff" followed by a performance drop or stall. There was low speed, forced liftoff, and marginal climb. Many experts say video shows a slow takeoff, exactly to be expected from a forced Vr. It made only a marginal climb up to 625 feet, again classic forced Vr. I think the most damning evidence is the first words in the Mayday call. The co-pilot said"Thrust not achieved". It's cryptic - suggesting they did not achieve the required thrust up to that point, confirming a forced Vr. 

The Landing Gear Issue:
By the time the "Gear Up" order was issued, the plane should be about 50 ft off the air. The fact the gear was not up suggests 3 possibilities:

(i) A certain expert Capt Steve explained several possibilities for the crash on the first day. At that time the May day message was not yet known. He leaned towards human error. According to him, when the captain said "Gear Up", the co-pilot mistakenly pulled the lever which retracted the wing flaps. That explains why the wheels were still down. With flaps retracted, the plane losses lift.   
(ii) Hydraulic failure. The wheels could not be retracted. That perhaps explains why the RAT was deployed.( Explained below.)
(iii) My most likely reason - With a forced Vr, the pilot is wary of a tail strike, that's why no "Gear Up" was ordered. Leaving landing gear extended causes drag which slows the climb. So obviously the pilot had to gear up asap. But in a forced Vr liftoff, the cockpit was already in an emergency to maximise lift and thrust.  Gear up was not their focus. They forgot about it.  Cockpit voice record will clarify.

The most likely scenario is (iii). But then this raises the question. It means hydraulic system has not failed. If so, why was RAT deployed? (Explained below)

The wing flap issue:
Flap setting is one of the critical settings in a takeoff because it affects lift. Boeing 787-8 has 8 flap settings. Each setting extends the wing flaps to a certain degree. Flap 20 is for full extension which is used in landing. On takeoff, normally F1aps 5 or Flaps 10 are used.  From the videos, many experts say the flaps were not extended. Actually it is very difficult from the video.

The problem is, if wing flaps were not extended, it is a "Configuration error" for which the 787-8 has several bells and whistles to get the pilot's attention. There is no way for the pilot not to know it when the alarm goes off. This points to 2 possibilities:
(i) There were some logic failures. (Electrical or electronic problems). No alerts were given.
(ii) It could be Flaps 1 was extended which is very minimal so cannot be determined on video. Because a flap was selected, though a wrong one, the system did not send out alerts.

The RAT (Ram Air Turbine) issue:
There is an aviation engineer Jeff Ostroff whose youtube chanel I used to follow. From the very first day, I had seen his video explaining AI171 must have the RAT deployed. That Capt Steve mentioned above had corrected his first video after Ostroff's video three days later. He changed his mind from human error to dual engine fail as confirmed by the May day call. Many caught this RAT thing and started pointing it out on the video. No, I don't think that video showing the plane going down can show the RAT because it is too small. Engineer Jeff Ostroff suggested this from the audio angle.

This is a 2 min clip part of Ostroff's video where he explained the RAT and showed the audio of AI171 and 2 other planes which had RAT deployed. The sound is a mix of jet engine and a propeller plane. The jet engines are still functioning. (Did you catch what I am saying?).

In the case of 787, RAT is auto deployed when (i) some major electrical or hydraulic system failed, or (ii) there was power generator failure. Many experts are pointing to RAT and the Mayday message as ultimate prove it was a case of dual engine failure. There was no engine failure. It was power generation failure. There are not the same thing.

The lone survivor Vishwash Kumar Ramesh said he heard a loud explosion approximately 30 seconds after takeoff. He also said the lights dimmed for a while. Ramesh is an extremely crucial witness here. The sound he heard was RAT being deployed. The lights dimming is usual during a RAT deployment as electrical systems are reset. 30 seconds after takeoff the plane was still in ascend for the next 4 mins. This means the engines were still working when RAT deployed. It means RAT was deployed because there was either (i) hydraulic failure (if gear up order was given and wheels could not be retracted - which we don't know), OR (ii) there was power generation failure which we now know because of Forced Vr and May day call that said "Thrust not achieved".  No one has pointed this out.

RAT does not provide additional power. It only provides electrical and hydraulic systems to support only core services like flight control instruments. However RAT allows pilots to control glide to plane to safety, only if they have altitude. For example in 2001 it allowed Air Transat 236 which lost fuel over the Atlantic, to glide for 19 minutes over 75 nautical miles or 139 km, to land safely in Azores.

The Dual Engine Failure Issue:
Double engine failure in a 787 is extremely rare. That's because they are independently powered and operated, separated physically and systemically, has extreme redundancy built in and fault isolation, subject to strict maintenance standards. The plane was built to be able to fly with one engine in an emergency.

Although extremely rare, dual engine failure is still possible:
1. By fuel contamination - possible.
2. By bird ingestion - it would need a huge flock. Didn't happen. No dead birds found. No sparks from engines.
3. Maintenance error - under investigation.
4. Passing through volcanic ash - didn't happen.
5. Failure of FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) - FADEC is common to both engines. Thus its failure affects both engines.
6. Misconfiguration plus underthrust - 787 is super hitech. Before flying, lots of data are input. If there is a misconfiguration, such as wing flaps retracted, the system warns "Configuration Mismatch". But it can still liftoff safely with minor config errors. But if the config error causes underthrust, then it is very dangerous because it will affect the aviation aerodynamics.

Difference between mechanical engine failure and power generation failure:
Mechanical engine failure - Engine physically damaged, leads to flameout, shutdown or fire. Caused by fan blade loss, compressor stall, bird ingestion, fuel starvation, bearing seizure, etc. Engines produce no thrust and very dangerous. RAT deployment may or may not occur depending on what systems fail  Dual mechanical engine failure is almost impossible.
Power generation failure - Engine still running, but it fails to generate usable electrical or hydraulic power. Caused by electrical bus failures, generator failure, FADEC malfunction, software crash, etc. Engine may still be providing some thrust but not controlled properly. RAT deploys to replace lost electrical power. 

The Mayday message is critical. It said "Thrust not achieved" - implies engines running but underperforming. 

The Maintenance Issues:
The aircraft's insurance coverage was increased recently which is a sign of engine change and other major work. I believe a major scheduled maintenance in April 2025 included an engine change. Investigation is zooming in on technical faults - engine failure, wing flap deployment issues, landing gear malfunctions. It is not known if maintenance included all these.

Other post-maintenance incidents of Air India:
* 2019 - Airbus 320 engine falling off during installation.
* 2008 - Boeing 777 in Mumbai had fuel-leak alerts before takeoff, traced to maintenance shortfalls.
* 2019 - Boeing 777 caught fire in its auxiliary power unit during repairs.
* 2015 - AI619 a technician was killed when his clothes were sucked into a running engine during push back of the plane.
* 1998 - Dornier 228 Crash shortly after takeoff due to horizontal stabiliser actuator failure. Fault - missing hi-hok fasterners.

Post-maintenance incidents of other Indian carriers:
* 2024 - Spicejet took off from Chennai. Returned mid-flight due to tech issues. Landed safely.
* 2023 - IndiGo - plane took off from Delhi. Returned after take-off due to hydraulic system failure.
* 2022 - Hydraulic leak forced one Indigo plane to divert.

Air India has maintenance facilities at Delhi, Mumbai, Nagpur,Hosur, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Thiruvanathapuram.

Praful Patel, a former Civil Aviation Minister, questioned why Singapore Airlines, which holds a 25% stake in Air India and is involved in it's maintenance operations, has been "deafeningly silent". He suggested SIA should be held accountable and criticised its lack of public engagement during the crisis. He has even called the silence "suspicious".

SIA is a 25% shareholder in Air India. The two are entirely different legal entities. It is highly inappropriate for SIA to say anything, unless it is the majority owner. Tata is the major shareholder, and it's chairman spoke out in defence of SIA against Patel's comments.

SIA Engineering Co has a 12 year contract signed (2024) with Air India for Inventory Technical Management but for their A320 fleet only. It is currently building a mega MRO base in partnership with Air India. This complex will include widebody and narrowbody hangar along with component repair shops. It marks SIAEC's first maintenance expansion in India in line with Tata-SIA's Airbus orders and fleet growth.

My Personal Opinion:
There was possible config error with wing flaps not properly extended. It was deployed, otherwise warnings would have blasted at the cockpit. It was selection error which bypassed config error detection. Without the proper flap selection, the plane did not have efficient lift. But that is not the cause for the crash.

Either the plane was heavily max out on the load, or there was pre-knowledge of some engine efficiency issues, the pilot backtracks to the threshold of the runway to give more space for runoff to generate the speed needed for takeoff. At 3,000m which should have been the furthest distance on the runway for AI171's Decision Point V1 the Flightdata shows speed of 25-50 knots which is extremely dangerous as 787 needs minimum 135 knots for takeoff. It is mad not to abort. It is possible inherent electrical problems caused instruments to show reading of higher knots, but still not yet 135. So pilot pushes the plane, confident he can hit 135 shortly. He has no choice but to do a forced rotation at the end of the runway with Flightdata showing V1 of about just 100 knots. 

The plane lifts off. What happened seems like a classic case of config mismatch with underthrust. The engines aree running but under performing in power generation, as confirmed by the Mayday call of "Thrust not achieved". So the pilot now has 2 simultaneous issues - not enough thrust from engines, exacerbated by wrong wing flap selection which meant lesser lift.

At liftoff with underthrust, pilot avoids gear up for fear of tail strike. Frantic to gain height, he pitches aggressively, pulling the yoke to the stops and maximising the angle of attack. The already under performing power generator is further strained by a high angle of attack which causes engine wind intake issues that affect the compressors. Dual power generator fails and RAT is automatically and immediately deployed within 30 seconds after liftoff. In a forced liftoff with underthrust, followed by loss of lift due to max angle of attack, and power generation outage, the plane's only hope left is for the RAT to allow it to glide to safety. Unfortunately, there was no altitude for the pilot to play the last card offered by the RAT, so the plane descends in a managed-glide, going down in a controlled manner to its doom.

Lost of power generation is the ultimate factor. It seems the plane could not achieve the thrust for Vr. Investigations may probably lead to maintenance issues. The ultimate fault, however, is pilot error. He was still waiting for Decision Speed V1, but at 3,000m mark on the runway, it was Final Decision Point to ensure a safety margin. He made the decision to continue with the runoff. He made the wrong decision. No two ways about it. However one looks at it, a Forced Rotation is Pilot Error.

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